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“That’s what books are for… to travel without moving an inch.” (Lahiri, 2019, 
p.16). Many people have experienced it: they are reading a book and feel as 
though they have been transported into another world, seeing the events 
unfold as though they were watching a movie. Indeed, there are many studies 
showing that readers report experiencing spontaneous mental imagery while 
they are reading (e.g., Long, Winograd, & Bridge, 1989; Sadoski, 1983; 1985; 
Sadoski, Goetz, Kangiser, 1988). The idea that perception and language 
comprehension are linked has been around for millennia (Barsalou, 1999). 
Since the 20th century, scientists have actively begun testing and theorizing 
how language is represented in the brain. Although there are many theories of 
how language is processed, two main branches exist that encompass many of 
these theories, namely the traditional views of cognition and grounded (or 
embodied) cognition.  
Traditional views of cognition 
Especially in the 20th century, research on psycholinguistics was focused on 
the belief that the processing of language makes use of amodal symbols, a 
trend that was strongly influenced by the developments in mathematics, 
computer science, and formal logic. What is meant by “amodal” here is that 
the symbols contain no direct link to the sensorimotor systems of the brain. 
For example, if one were to learn the concept “tree”, this could happen as 
follows: a child sees a tree for the first time while a parent provides a label for 
the object, so that the arbitrary sound “tree” is linked to its referent. During 
encoding, the sensory information (e.g., what a tree looks like, the sound of 
the word “tree”) is first transduced into a new type of representational 
language, before it is stored in larger structures (e.g., feature lists, frames, 
schemata, semantic networks, etc.), where it can be manipulated for various 
cognitive processes (Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1984). The result of this 
transduction, however, is that the created symbols do not retain any of the 
1414447-Mannaert_BNW.indd   10 17-01-20   16:42
General Introduction 
3 
?
sensory information present during the real-world experiences. Cognition is 
therefore viewed as a system separated from perception, containing only 
arbitrary links to the sensorimotor systems of the brain, which are not required 
for the actual cognitive processes occurring within the brain.  
Although using amodal symbol systems as an explanation for cognition has its 
advantages (e.g., it can easily explain the processing of abstract concepts), the 
largest problem with this theory is the symbol grounding problem (Harnad, 
1990). Harnad argued that a system that is based on the manipulation of 
meaningless symbols cannot be grounded in anything other than more 
meaningless symbols. He provides the example of trying to learn Chinese as a 
first language from a Chinese/Chinese dictionary. A person looks up one 
symbol in the dictionary, only to be faced with multiple other symbols. In 
turn, when those symbols are looked up, more Chinese symbols are provided. 
In essence, it is impossible to derive meaning from any of the symbols without 
connecting them up to the real world.   
Grounded cognition 
Theories of grounded cognition (also referred to as “embodied cognition”) are 
based on the idea that cognition has to be grounded in perception (Barsalou, 
1999; 2008). The way this works is through the use of mental simulations, 
which are defined as the “reenactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective 
states acquired during experience with the world, body, and mind” (Barsalou, 
2008, p.618). This differs from traditional accounts of cognition in one very 
important way: rather than transducing perceptual states into some 
meaningless symbols that are manipulated by an independent system, these 
perceptual states are captured and partially reactivated whenever this is 
required for a cognitive process. In our previous “tree” example, when the boy 
sees the tree, there is activation across the sensorimotor systems of the brain. 
The way the tree looks is captured by the visual system, the sound of the 
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rustling leaves is captured by the auditory system, the smell of the blooming 
flowers is captured by the olfactory system, and so forth. Whenever the 
concept “tree” has to be accessed again (e.g., when coming across the word 
“tree” in a book), this pattern of activation is partially reactivated and 
integrated into a multimodal simulation. Barsalou (1999) in his Perceptual 
Symbol Systems (PSS) theory suggests that not the exact same pattern of 
activation that occurs during the actual experience is reactivated, but that only 
a subset of this pattern is stored as a perceptual symbol, which is used for 
these simulations. 
Not much evidence exists for the traditional view of cognition, and this is 
mostly because amodal symbols can be used to explain all experimental 
findings, making the theory unfalsifiable. The benefits of the grounded 
cognition theories are that they allow for specific predictions to be made 
regarding the activation of the brain or the behavior of participants in 
cognitive experiments. For instance, if the sensorimotor systems are required 
for language comprehension, then we would expect these systems to become 
activated while performing linguistic tasks. Indeed, a functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) study by Hauk, Johnsrude, and Pulvermüller 
(2004) illustrated that the same areas of the brain become activated when a 
verb signifying an action is read as when that action is actually performed. 
Moreover, the specificity of action verbs (e.g., to clean versus to wipe) can 
modulate the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) response in the bilateral 
inferior parietal lobule, a region associated with representing action plans 
(Van Dam, Rueschemeyer, & Bekkering, 2010). This activation of motor 
areas while reading action verbs has not only been found in adults, but in 
children as well (James & Maouene, 2009). Moreover, Pulvermüller, Hauk, 
Nikulin, and Ilmoniemi (2005) conducted a transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) experiment to find a causal link between the motor areas and the 
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processing of action words. They found that stimulating arm areas led to faster 
responses on a lexical decision task when words associated with arm 
movements were shown. Furthermore, when the leg areas were stimulated, 
participants responded faster to the words associated with leg movements. 
Together, these studies provide ample evidence for the existence of a link 
between the motor cortex and action-related language.  
Aside from action verbs relating to the motor regions of the brain, 
neuroimaging studies have also shown that the same areas of the brain activate 
when you produce speech sounds as when you hear them (Pulvermüller et al., 
2006; Wilson, Saygin, Sereno, Iacoboni, 2004). Furthermore, reading words 
associated with particular odors (e.g., garlic, jasmine) also leads to activation 
of the primary olfactory cortex (González et al., 2006). Similarly, gustatory 
words (e.g. chocolate, mustard) produce activation in the primary and 
secondary gustatory cortices (Barrós-Loscertales et al., 2012). Due to this 
consistent link being found between language and the sensorimotor areas of 
the brain, many researchers agree that those systems are involved in some way 
in language comprehension. 
Interestingly, the degree of this involvement is still a current topic of debate. 
Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, and Vigliocco (2012) conducted a theoretical 
review of the relevant theories, placed them on a continuum of embodiment, 
and reviewed the evidence for the different viewpoints. They concluded that 
the strongly embodied theories, which argue that cognition requires a 
complete dependence on sensorimotor systems, have insufficient scientific 
support as they would predict that the primary sensorimotor cortices would be 
active during all semantic tasks, and this is not supported by the neuroimaging 
data. Similarly, they found no evidence for a completely unembodied view of 
cognition, which argues that there is absolutely zero overlap between language 
and sensorimotor areas of the brain and that the activations of those systems 
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would be due to indirect pathways. This leaves us with the two remaining 
views on the continuum: weak embodiment versus secondary embodiment. 
Theories of weak embodiment suggest that semantic representations contain 
sensorimotor information, but that this information is abstracted to some 
extent (ibid). What this means is that information is taken from the primary 
modalities and potentially integrated in areas adjacent to these primary 
cortices. This integrated modal information then forms the basis of semantic 
content. As the information is abstracted away from the primary cortices, this 
can no longer be called strong embodiment, as this would no longer constitute 
a complete simulation of the real-world (ibid). Note that Barsalou’s (1999) 
PSS theory could also be interpreted as weak embodiment as that theory 
similarly argues only a subset of the original activation pattern is stored to be 
used for cognitive processes later. Evidence for weak embodiment comes from 
studies showing that the motor cortex become activated very quickly (roughly 
200ms) after encountering action words (Hauk, Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 
2008; Meteyard et al., 2012).  
Theories of secondary embodiment argue that there is an amodal core 
processor which contains non-arbitrary connections to the sensorimotor 
systems. Semantic content is therefore amodal in nature, and when activated 
leads to the passive activation of the sensorimotor systems via a spreading 
activation mechanism (Meteyard et al., 2012). According to Mahon and 
Caramazza (2008), language impairments caused by damage to the 
sensorimotor systems can be explained by concepts becoming isolated.  
To sum up, the main differences between theories of secondary embodiment 
and weak embodiment are whether semantic content is sensorimotor or 
amodal in nature. Secondary embodiment suggests that there is an independent 
semantic hub that contains non-arbitrary connections to the sensorimotor 
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systems, while weak embodiment suggests there are multiple zones (e.g., 
convergence zones, see Damasio, 1989) where modal information that is 
abstracted away from the primary sensorimotor cortex is integrated. Given that 
both theories can potentially explain the findings published in the embodied 
cognition literature, more research is needed to make strong conclusions 
regarding the actual nature of semantic representations. 
Language and situated simulation 
The theories described above suggest that knowledge can only be stored via 
one type of representation. Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, and Wilson (2008) 
instead propose that both linguistic forms from the brain’s language systems 
and mental simulations from the modalities are combined to represent 
knowledge. According to their proposed framework, the language and situated 
simulation theory (LASS), when a word is perceived, the linguistic system is 
activated first, which immediately activates word associations (e.g., ‘chicken’ 
activates ‘egg’), which can provide superficial strategies for certain cognitive 
tasks without requiring the retrieval of deeper conceptual knowledge. Once the 
linguistic system recognizes the word, associated simulations become active, 
which make use of sensorimotor and introspective areas of the brain in order 
to represent the meaning of the concept. 
The authors explain how, when nonwords in a lexical decision task are easily 
distinguishable from words, only the linguistic system needs to be accessed to 
complete the task, as the word’s meaning does not need to be activated to 
provide an accurate response. However, when nonwords are phonologically 
and orthographically similar to actual words, the simulation system needs to 
be recruited to complete the task as deeper conceptual information needs to be 
accessed to provide an accurate response. 
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Evidence for LASS comes from a study by Santos, Chaigneau, Simmons, and 
Barsalou (2014), who used a property generation task, where participants 
received a cue word and had to come up with as many properties of that word 
as they could think of. Their results illustrated that the properties that were 
produced earlier on tended to be related linguistically to the word cue (i.e., via 
word associations, for e???????????? ?????g), while the properties that were 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?
flowers). These findings were further supported in an fMRI study by 
Simmons, Hamann, Harenski, Hu, and Barsalou (2008), who found that 
activations early in conceptual processing overlapped with activations for 
word associations, and that activations for later conceptual processing 
overlapped with activations for situated generation (where participants had to 
think of a situation where a certain word would appear and how to describe it). 
Together these findings provide support for the idea that language systems and 
simulation systems interact to support language comprehension. 
Mental simulations 
Given the clear importance of the simulation system in language 
comprehension, it is important to gain a clear understanding of both the 
content and the underlying mechanisms of mental simulations. Several 
behavioral studies have been conducted over the past two decades to provide 
us with an idea of the contents of mental simulations. In an experiment by 
Stanfield and Zwaan (2001), participants read sentences that implied a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
pencil is standing upright) and performed a sentence-picture verification task. 
Important to note here is that, according to the traditional theories of 
?????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????
(ibid). Conversely, the PSS theory would predict that a simulation of the event 
described by the sentence would be created and thus should lead to faster 
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responses when the picture shown matches the implied orientation. Indeed, 
participants responded significantly faster to the pictures that matched the 
implied orientation compared to the pictures that mismatched, suggesting that 
object orientation is actively simulated during language comprehension when 
orientation is relevant. 
This “match effect” has been found for many different object properties, 
namely shape (Pecher & Zwaan, 2012; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002), 
visibility (Yaxley & Zwaan, 2007), motion (Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley, & 
Aveyard, 2004), sound (Brunyé, Ditman, Mahoney, Walters, & Taylor, 2010) 
and has also been found in children (Engelen, Bouwmeester, de Bruin, & 
Zwaan, 2011) and elderly populations (Dijkstra, Yaxley, Madden, & Zwaan, 
2004). Combined, these studies provide support for the idea that mental 
simulations are involved in language comprehension, and that these are modal 
in nature. 
The role of color in mental simulations 
Interestingly, for the object property color, conflicting findings exist in the 
literature. A study by Connell (2007) found that participants responded 
significantly faster to pictures that mismatched the color implied by the 
sentence compared to those that matched. When Pecher and Zwaan (2012) 
conducted a replication of that study, they did find a significant match effect. 
This led to the question: in what capacity is color present in mental 
simulations? In Chapter 2, we investigated the role of color in mental 
simulations by performing a conceptual replication of the Connell and Pecher 
and Zwaan studies. The main difference between our study and those that 
came before is that we used an improved stimulus set. In the original studies, 
there were several items that could change shape as well as color (e.g., a steak 
that is cooked has a different shape than a raw steak), and items that do not 
describe color (e.g., a polar bear is white). As such, the first goal of our study 
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was to examine the role of color in mental simulations. Given the previous 
literature on mental simulations, we expected to find a significant match effect 
for color.   
The second goal of our study was to examine how much sensory information 
is captured by mental simulations, which was done by lowering the saturation 
of the pictures. When lowering the saturation of pictures, there are two 
possible outcomes. Firstly, it is possible that the facilitation provided by the 
matching color is eliminated, leading to a slower response in the match 
condition compared to when the picture is shown in full saturation. Secondly, 
it is possible that, as a result of the saturation being lowered, there is a less 
vivid difference between the mismatching picture and the mental simulation 
(i.e., less interference), thus leading to a faster response in the mismatch 
condition. We expected that the match advantage would be decreased when 
saturation is lowered.  
The final goal of this study was to examine whether a match advantage still 
exists when pictures are shown completely in grayscale. We expected to find 
no significant match effect here as this would provide contradictory evidence 
for the grounded cognition approach. Conducting this experiment was of 
interest as studies overall have shown that color aids in object recognition (e.g. 
Bramão, Reis, Petersson, & Faísca, 2011), so we expected that participants 
would respond significantly faster when the pictures are shown in color 
compared to when they are shown in grayscale.  
The updating of mental simulations 
Many studies on mental simulations have provided us with the knowledge of 
which object properties are actively simulated during language 
comprehension, but researchers are now more and more interested in how 
these mental simulations unfold across texts. For example, studies have shown 
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that mental simulations can be reactivated a later point in time (Pecher, Van 
Dantzig, Zwaan, & Zeelenberg, 2009), and can remain activated longer when 
an ongoing situation is described compared to a situation that has already 
occurred (Madden & Therriault, 2009; Madden & Zwaan, 2003; Magliano & 
Schleich, 2000). Most studies examining this, however, have examined 
updating within the context of the situation model, not mental simulations. 
For language comprehension, three levels of representation have been 
identified: the surface text form, which refers to the exact words and syntax 
used in the text; the textbase, which refers to the abstract representation of the 
ideas in the text; and the situation model, which is the mental representation of 
the events described in a text (Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998). When the situation model was first introduced as a 
construct for language comprehension, it was believed that the mental 
representations used to create the situation model were amodal in nature. More 
recently, however, researchers have thought that those mental representations 
are perceptual in nature (Zwaan, 2016), and thus can also be called mental 
simulations.  
Given the role of mental simulations in building the situation model that 
supports language comprehension, it is important to gain a clear understanding 
of how this works. Many studies on situation model updating have used 
reading times as a measure for updating, but this tells us nothing about the 
actual activation patterns of mental simulations. Given that mental simulations 
can remain active over longer periods of time or can reactivate if the context 
requires it, how do these simulations behave in a changing discourse context? 
This question was the focus of Chapter 3 in this dissertation. 
In this chapter, we were interested in examining whether implying a change in 
shape, over the course of two or four sentences, would lead to the 
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simultaneous activation of both the initial and the final shape, or whether the 
initially implied shape would deactivate. Based on the fact that mental 
simulations can remain activated for a while, we hypothesized that when 
implying one shape directly after the other (i.e., in two sentences), that both 
shapes would remain activated in the mental simulation. We further expected 
that when the final shape is emphasized using three sentences (out of four 
sentences in total) that the initial shape would become deactivated as more 
emphasis was placed on the final shape.  
The updating of situation models in older adults 
Much of the research that has been done on cognitive aging over the past 
several decades has focused on the deterioration of cognitive functions. More 
recently, however, there has been a shift to examining the preservation of 
functions in older adults. One such an example is the preservation of situation 
model updating in older adults. In Chapter 4, we present a review of the 
prominent theories on situation model updating, the evidence for preservation 
of this function in an aging population, and how this compares to young 
adults. 
The completeness of mental simulations 
As mentioned previously, many studies have illustrated that various object 
properties are activated in mental simulations. Importantly, however, these 
studies have only ever examined the presence of a single object in mental 
simulations, and never whether multiple objects can be combined. If the 
building of a comprehensive situation model is required for language 
comprehension to occur, then the situation model should contain a complete 
representation of the events described by the text, but this has not been studied 
before. As such, in Chapter 5, the research question of interest was: do we 
combine multiple objects in a mental simulation in order to construct a 
comprehensive situation model, and is this influenced by task instructions?   
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In this chapter, we present two experiments that had participants read 
sentences describing animals using a tool in a particular way. After reading the 
sentence, participants had to press a button indicating whether the pictured 
cartoon animal (experiment 1) or tool (experiment 2) was mentioned in the 
previous sentence. The pictured cartoon animal either completely matched 
(i.e., both the correct animal and tool were shown), partially matched or 
mismatched (i.e., either the correct animal or tool was shown), or completely 
mismatched (i.e., neither the correct animal nor tool was shown) the event 
described by the previous sentence. If task instructions can influence the 
contents of a mental simulation, then this has significant consequences for the 
relevance of mental simulations in language comprehension. However, if a 
complete mental simulation of the events described in a text is required for 
language comprehension to progress smoothly, then we would expect both the 
animal and the tool in this study to be simulated. We expected that a complete 
mental simulation would be created by reading the sentence, and thus would 
lead to significantly faster responses in the complete match condition 
compared to the partial match condition, regardless of task instructions. 
The deactivation of mental simulations 
While reading a text, many dimensions are tracked throughout the narrative, 
such as the objects, goals, locations, events, and actions described (Zwaan, 
Langston, & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan, Radvansky, Hilliard, & Curiel, 1998), 
and subsequently are integrated into a situation model. Given that many events 
are tracked throughout a narrative, does this mean every time a particular 
dimension is involved that all of the associated information is reactivated? For 
instance, when one starts reading a novel, usually a lot of information 
regarding the looks of the protagonist and the side characters are described. 
Once a mental simulation of this character is built, does this reactivate every 
time this character is mentioned?  
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In Chapter 6, we investigated whether color is continuously activated in 
mental simulations across a changing discourse context. Based on the findings 
that color is actively simulated during language comprehension, we were 
interested in how this object property evolves when changes occur in a 
narrative. For example, when reading the sentences “The boy rode on the red 
bicycle to the station. At the station he stepped off of his bicycle.”, would the 
color red become reactivated when only the object is mentioned the second 
time?  
Contradictory findings exist in the literature regarding the continued activation 
of perceptual information when events change. Swallow et al. (2009), for 
instance, found that perceptual details can be cleared from active memory if 
the target object is not present at event boundaries, while Pecher et al. (2009) 
found that perceptual information can be retained for long periods of time. In 
order to fully understand the role of mental simulations in language 
comprehension, it is important to know how the perceptual content of these 
simulations are affected by a narrative.   
In the current study, participants read stories made of one (experiment 1), two 
(experiment 2), or five sentences (experiment 3). When the story was one 
sentence long, this sentence could either make a reference to a color or make 
no reference to a color. When the story was two or five sentences long, either 
the first or last sentence made a reference to a color. Participants performed a 
sentence-picture verification task where they judged whether the pictured 
object was mentioned in the previous sentence or not. These pictures were 
shown either in full color or in grayscale. Based on the findings from Chapter 
2, we expected that participants would respond significantly faster to colored 
pictures when a color was mentioned, compared to pictures shown in 
grayscale. In the second experiment, we expected that color would deactivate 
when the second sentence did not refer to a color, as this would not be 
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necessary for language comprehension. Based on the findings from the second 
experiment, we expected that, in the third experiment, color would continue to 
be activated, even at the end of a five-sentence story. 
The importance of preregistration 
There are several commonalities across the chapters in this dissertation. The 
first of which is that the method used to study mental simulations is the 
sentence-picture verification paradigm. This paradigm is often used in 
psycholinguistics research because it allows us to examine whether the 
pictures shown match what is activated in mental simulations, and thus allows 
us to gain insights into the underlying mechanisms of language 
comprehension.  
The second commonality in the chapters of this dissertation is that all the 
experiments from each chapter were preregistered online prior to data 
collection. Unfortunately, questionable research practices (QRPs) have been 
rife in psychology. Researchers perform post-hoc analyses and report them as 
planned, they run many different experiments or analyses and only report the 
ones that show a significant p-value, they choose to stop data collection when 
a significant p-value has been reached, or choose which outliers to remove 
from the dataset to ensure a significant finding. These are just some of the 
examples of QRPs that have been reported in psychology, a problem which 
led to the Reproducibility Project, a project that set out to replicate 100 studies 
in psychology, and found that only about a third of the effects could be 
replicated (Nosek et al., 2015). One of the solutions to the replication crisis in 
psychology is for researchers to preregister their hypotheses, data collection 
plan, analysis plan, and materials online, prior to data collection. This way, a 
reader can be certain that the results and conclusions of those studies did not 
come about via QRPs. The URLs of all the preregistrations of the current 
dissertation can be accessed on: https://osf.io/qezt6.    
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Is Color an Integral Part of a Rich Mental Simulation? 
 
This chapter has been published as: 
Hoeben Mannaert, L. N., Dijkstra, K., & Zwaan, R. A. (2017). Is color an 
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Abstract 
Research suggests that language comprehenders simulate visual features such 
as shape during language comprehension. In sentence-picture verification 
tasks, whenever pictures match the shape or orientation implied by the 
previous sentence, responses are faster than when the pictures mismatch 
implied visual aspects. However, mixed results have been demonstrated when 
the sentence-picture paradigm was applied to color (Connell, 2007; Zwaan & 
Pecher, 2012). One of the aims of the current investigation was to resolve this 
issue. This was accomplished by conceptually replicating the original study on 
color, using the same paradigm but a different stimulus set. The second goal of 
this study was to assess how much perceptual information is included in a 
mental simulation. We examined this by reducing color saturation, a 
manipulation that does not sacrifice object identifiability. If reduction of one 
aspect of color does not alter the match effect, it would suggest that not all 
perceptual information is relevant for a mental simulation. Our results did not 
support this: We found a match advantage when objects were shown at normal 
levels of saturation, but this match advantage disappeared when saturation was 
reduced, yet still aided in object recognition compared to when color was 
entirely removed. Taken together, these results clearly show a strong match 
effect for color, and the perceptual richness of mental simulations during 
language comprehension. 
Keywords: Color, language comprehension, perception, mental simulation  
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Introduction 
Many empirical studies have supported theories of grounded cognition, which 
suggest that we use the same sensorimotor regions in the brain during activity 
as during cognitive processes, through the use of mental simulations 
(Barsalou, 1999, 2008). It has been argued that activation of perceptual areas 
in the brain during language comprehension are not merely epiphenomenal but 
that language can, in addition to communication, serve as a control mechanism 
to shape mental content (Lupyan & Bergen, 2015). One such experiment 
examined whether we create mental simulations of an object’s orientation 
when the orientation is implied in the sentence (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; 
Zwaan & Pecher, 2012). The study showed that when the implied orientation 
matches the orientation of the object shown in an object-verification task, that 
reaction times are shorter than when they mismatch, suggesting that we create 
mental simulations during sentence comprehension. This match advantage has 
also been found for visual aspects such as shape (Zwaan, Stanfield, & 
Yaxley, 2002), visibility (Yaxley & Zwaan, 2006), and motion (Zwaan, 
Madden, Yaxley, & Aveyard, 2004); has been found for children (Engelen, 
Bouwmeester, de Bruin, & Zwaan, 2011) as well as for the elderly population 
(Dijkstra, Yaxley, Madden, & Zwaan, 2004); that spoken words also rapidly 
activate visual representations that affect our ability to recognize objects 
(Ostarek & Huettig, 2017); and the shape of an object becomes activated 
during encoding, and not simply during retrieval (Zeng, Zheng, & Mo, 2016). 
However, mixed results have been found when this sentence-picture paradigm 
was applied to color. For instance, Connell’s (2007) study illustrated an 
advantage in the mismatch condition. Connell (2007) suggested that color may 
be represented differently than other visual features because it is one of the 
few object properties that is unimodal, (i.e., it can only be perceived with the 
visual modality) and has been shown to be less vital to object identification 
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than shape (Tanaka, Weiskopf, & Williams, 2001) or orientation (Harris & 
Dux, 2005). Thus, it should be easier for participants to ignore mismatching 
color information and focus on a stable object property such as shape than to 
ignore the matching color as it aids in solving the task demands and requires 
processing. Zwaan and Pecher (2012), however, conducted six replication 
experiments to investigate this match advantage in greater detail for object 
orientation, shape, and color, and found a match advantage for all three object 
properties. Moreover, the match advantage for color had a larger effect size 
than those for shape and orientation. Another study also appeared to support a 
match advantage for color, as reading words in a color (e.g., white ink) 
matching the color implied by a previous sentence (e.g., Joe was excited to see 
a bear at the North Pole) facilitated reading times (Connell & Lynott, 2009). 
These contradictory findings in studies examining color as part of mental 
simulations prompt further questions into how we process color during 
language comprehension and how much sensory information we include in 
these simulations. One possibility is that color is an unstable visual feature in 
mental simulations, as the color of an object can change without eliminating 
the ability to recognize the object, and therefore may play a less present role in 
mental simulations. 
One of the goals of the current investigation was to address the potential 
problem of color instability caused by the stimulus set used in the original 
study (Connell, 2007) and in the replications (Zwaan & Pecher, 2012). To 
address this issue, we created a stimulus set that met more stringent criteria 
with regard to the visual features than the earlier stimulus sets did. For 
example, there were some items in the previous study in which features other 
than color could vary (i.e., a steak that is cooked has a different shape than a 
steak that is raw). This problem does not occur for more carefully chosen, less 
variable, items, such as a red or green tomato. Therefore, in the current 
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investigation, all potentially problematic items were removed and replaced 
with stimuli that could undergo a color change while their shape remained 
unaltered. Another difference in our stimulus set was that full-color 
photographs were used rather than line drawings, to allow for a more realistic 
representation of the described objects (Holmes & Wolff, 2011). 
The second goal of the study was to examine how much sensory information 
is captured in a mental simulation. Color is a useful tool for exploring this, as 
it is the only visual feature that can be decomposed into different dimensions, 
namely hue, saturation, and brightness (Palmer, 1999). This decomposition is 
solely a color aspect manipulation as the decomposition process still allows 
for the object to be recognized (i.e., there is no change in shape, size, or 
orientation). For instance, a tomato without hue will simply become a gray 
tomato, maintaining its shape and preserving all other visual features. At the 
same time, however, changes in color, saturation or brightness affect the 
richness of the visual stimulus, as these dimensions alter what is typical about 
the visual properties of the stimulus. Thus, if these dimensions affect the 
richness of the visual stimulus, is it necessary to represent them in a mental 
simulation? When one processes a sentence implying a certain color, is 
information regarding the saturation of the color stored? For example, when 
reading about a ripe tomato, would a simulation include a bright red, or would 
this not be as vital to the simulation as other sensory information? 
Our current study explored how much sensory information is included in 
mental simulations by conducting four experiments, using the same 
experimental paradigm as Connell (2007) and Zwaan and Pecher (2012) 
where sentences are used to imply a certain color, followed by an object-
verification task. For example, the sentence The driving instructor told Bob to 
stop at the traffic lights is used to imply a red traffic light, rather than 
explicitly stating The driving instructor told Bob to stop at the red light. After 
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reading a sentence implying a certain color, participants see either a matching 
(e.g., red light) or mismatching picture (e.g., green light) and have to press a 
button on the keyboard verifying whether the pictured object was mentioned 
in the previous sentence, where the correct answer to experimental items 
always required a “yes” response. 
The first experiment was conducted as a conceptual replication of Connell’s 
(2007) and Zwaan and Pecher’s (2012) experiments on color, to resolve which 
of the contradicting findings has more empirical support. Given the previous 
literature, we predicted to find a significant match advantage. Experiment 2a 
and 2b addressed the question of how much perceptual information is included 
in a mental simulation. This was accomplished by lowering the saturation of 
the pictures used in Experiment 1 to the lowest level at which the hue could 
still be recognized. It is possible that by reducing the level of saturation in the 
picture there is less of an overlap with what is currently being simulated, 
which could lead to there being less facilitation of a response in the match 
condition under low levels of saturation. A further possibility is that rather 
than the match condition acting as a facilitatory mechanism, the match effect 
exists due to there being a vivid difference between what is simulated and 
what is pictured in the mismatching condition. Reducing the level of 
saturation would then reduce the disparity between the picture and the 
simulation, leading to faster responses in the mismatch condition. In other 
words, there would be less interference. Experiment 3 examined whether a 
match advantage still exists when objects are shown completely in grayscale. 
This is of interest for several reasons. First, if a match advantage does appear 
under low levels of saturation, then it should disappear when the pictures are 
shown in grayscale. Second, studies have shown that color does aid in object 
recognition (Bramão, Reis, Petersson, & Faísca, 2011). With this in mind, we 
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expect that participants’ response times (RTs) in Experiments 1 and 2 will, 
overall, be faster than in Experiment 3, where no color is present. 
Ethics statement 
The participation in all four experiments and in the norming studies was 
voluntary. The participants subscribed to the experiments online. They were 
briefed with the content of each study but obtaining a written consent was not 
required by the Ethics Committee of Psychology at the Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands, who approved the project, because the 
experiments were non-invasive and the data collection and analysis were 
anonymous. 
Preregistration 
The predictions, exclusion criteria, design, methods, analyses, and materials of 
all the experiments reported in this article were preregistered in advance of 
data collection and analysis on an online research platform—Open Science 
Framework (OSF; see Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012; Nosek, Spies, & 
Motyl, 2012, for a detailed discussion on replications and preregistration). 
This ensured that confirmatory procedures (hypotheses testing) were 
conducted according to a priori criteria. In the current article, a clear 
distinction between confirmatory and explanatory analyses was made, as 
suggested by De Groot (1956/2014). The post hoc analyses are included in the 
Exploratory Analyses section 
?  
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Two hundred and five participants were recruited via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk1 (87 males, mean age 37.78 years, range: 20–87 years). The 
participants were paid $1.50 for their participation. 
Materials. The experimental flow was programmed in Qualtrics Survey 
Software. It allowed for an automatic collection of information such as 
Browser Type, Browser Version, Operating System, Screen Resolution, Flash 
Version, Java Support, and User Agent for each participant. 
Pictures. Thirty-two pictures were selected as experimental items and 16 as 
filler items. The pictures were obtained from the internet (Google image 
search engine). Picture size was unified across the trials: none of the pictures 
exceeded 300 × 300 pixels (approximately 7.9 × 7.9 cm onscreen). The 
objects depicted in the images had one dominant color (e.g., green in the green 
traffic light picture). The experimental items formed 16 pairs of objects, and 
pictures within a pair differed in color (i.e., red traffic light vs. green traffic 
light). The pictures of the objects within a pair were matched in terms of size 
and shape to ensure that neither shape nor size could be a confounding 
variable. 
Sentences. There were 48 sentences constructed in total: 32 experimental and 
16 filler sentences. Similar to the pictures, experimental sentences also formed 
pairs, with one sentence implying one color of an experimental and the other 
implying the color of the remaining item of the pair (see Figure 1). 
Participants viewed 16 experimental sentences and 16 filler sentences. Eight 
comprehension questions were added to half of the fillers to ensure that 
?
1 Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is an Internet marketplace that enables businesses/researchers to recruit 
participants for surveys/social science experiments. 
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participants did not simply “skim” through a given sentence but read and 
understood it. Additionally, six sentence-picture pairs were used as practice 
trials. 
Design and procedure. Design and procedure were almost identical to 
Connell (2007). There were four picture-sentence combinations, so four lists 
were created so that each group was presented with one of the possible 
combinations (see Figure 1). Each list contained the same proportion of 
experimental and filler sentences, and the various colors present in the pictures 
were spread evenly across groups. Thus, the experiment was a 2 (sentence 
version: Type 1, Type 2) × 2 (picture type: match, mismatch) × 4 (lists) 
design, with sentence version and picture type as within-subjects variables and 
lists as a between-subjects variable. 
 
Figure 1. Example of stimuli material used in each experiment. A matching 
picture illustrates that color was implied by the sentence (i.e., red when asked 
to stop at a traffic light), and a mismatching color illustrates that this color was 
not implied by the sentence.  
Participants were instructed to read the sentence and press the spacebar when 
they had understood it. They were informed that each sentence would be 
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followed by a picture, and their task was to decide whether the depicted object 
was mentioned in the preceding sentence. Participants were asked to respond 
as quickly and accurately as possible by pressing the L key for yes and 
the A key for a no answer. The responses were collected and saved 
automatically by the Qualtrics Survey Software. The instructions presented to 
the participants warned them that occasionally they would receive a question 
to test their comprehension of the previous sentence, to which they would 
either agree (by pressing the L key) or disagree (by pressing the A key). The 
trial sequence was as follows: a left aligned vertically centered fixation cross 
appeared on the screen for 1,000 ms followed by the sentence. After a 
spacebar press, a fixation cross was presented in the middle of the screen for 
500 ms followed by a picture. When a yes/no decision was made, a blank 
screen appeared for 500 ms, after which another trial began (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Example of an experimental trial sequence.  
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All experimental items required a yes response, and all filler items required 
a no response. As participants received six practice trials, it was clear for 
participants when a yes and no response was required. 
Results and Discussion 
The data from 42 participants were discarded from further analysis: five 
participants were not native English speakers, six participants reversed the 
response keys (which was indicated by accuracy scores at or below 21%), and 
31 had accuracy scores lower than 80%. The drop-out rates were not equally 
spread across the four lists. To make the cells equal and enable parametric 
tests to be run, the required number of participants who were at the bottom of 
each list was removed (total of 25). After the exclusion process, each list 
included 34 participants (136 participants in total). For the analysis, we 
collapsed participants across lists as list was not a factor in our preregistered 
plan of analysis. Finally, one item was removed from the analysis as the 
average item accuracy was below 80%. This would indicate that participants 
did not believe the pictured object belonged to the preceding sentence. 
Earlier research using the picture verification paradigm has used the median 
instead of mean reaction times (e.g., Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan & 
Pecher, 2012; Zwaan et al., 2002). An advantage of using medians compared 
to means is that their use does not necessitate further decisions regarding 
outlier removal (e.g., whether to use cutoffs based on standard deviations, 
absolute RTs, or a combination thereof). 
A paired-samples t test was conducted to investigate whether there was a 
match advantage for accuracy and RTs. For the RT analysis, only RTs of 
correct responses were included in the analysis. The participants showed 
significantly higher accuracy rates in the match condition (M= .96, SD = .06) 
than in the mismatch condition (M = .90, SD = .11), t(135) = 
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5.36, p < .001, d = 0.46, BF10 = 33380.05. The match advantage was also 
found in the RTs: the match condition was 104 ms faster than the mismatch 
condition (M = 1,230 ms, SD = 568 ms and M = 1,334 ms, SD = 676 ms, 
respectively). This difference was significant, t(135) = 3.00, p = .003, d = 
0.26, BF10 = 6.88. Participants’ accuracy when responding to the 
comprehension questions was high (M = 0.79, SD = 0.20). 
These findings support the results of Zwaan and Pecher (2012), rather than 
those of Connell (2007), and suggest that color, like shape and orientation, is 
an object property that is simulated during language comprehension. 
Experiment 2A 
The results of Experiment 1 served to illustrate that sentences implying color 
are represented in mental simulations but makes no conclusions as to how rich 
these simulations are. If color is not present in mental simulations, then 
reducing color saturation should not affect the match advantage. If we do 
simulate color, however, and do so vividly, then showing a mismatching 
pictures in full color should lead to a larger disparity between the two 
conditions than when saturation of the color is reduced. 
Experiment 2 examined this problem by reducing color saturation to the 
lowest level at which the hue can still be distinguished to test whether a match 
effect would still appear, and whether it would be smaller than in 
Experiment 1. 
Norming Study 
A norming study was conducted in order to determine the lowest saturation 
level possible at which a certain hue could still be recognized using the same 
pictures as in Experiment 1. Twenty-four subjects were shown six different 
saturation levels per picture and were asked to choose the picture that had the 
lowest level of saturation while they could still perceive the associated hue. 
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Picture saturation was adjusted using Microsoft Office Picture Manager’s 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and 100 is a very intense, color-rich picture). The pictures that were selected 
by the majority of the participants as having the least amount of color while 
still being able to recognize the hue were used in the experiment. 
Method 
Participants. Two hundred and eight participants (99 males, mean age 37.93 
years, range: 22–71 years) took part in this Mechanical Turk experiment. The 
participants were paid $1.50 for their participation. 
Materials. The stimuli used in the current experiment were adapted from 
Experiment 1, and the levels of saturation chosen for the stimuli were 
determined by the norming study described above (see Figure 1). The 
sentences remained unchanged. 
Design and Procedure. The design and procedure of Experiment 2 were 
identical to that of Experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion 
Sixty-eight participants were excluded from the analysis (five were not native 
English speakers; four appeared to have reversed the keys; 14 had accuracy 
below 80%; and 45 participants were excluded from the bottom of the lists to 
achieve equal numbers of subjects per list), leading to a total of 140 
participants being included in the analysis. 
A paired-samples t test was conducted to investigate whether there was a 
match advantage for accuracy and RTs. The results indicated no difference in 
accuracy rates between the match (M = .96, SD = .07) and mismatch condition 
(M = .95, SD = .08), t(139) = 0.98, p = .331, d = 0.08, BF10 = 0.15. There was 
also no difference in the RTs between the match (M = 1,156 ms, SD = 558 ms) 
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and the mismatch conditions (M = 1,165 ms, SD = 639 ms), t(139) = 
0.25, p = .801, d = 0.02, BF10 = 0.10. Comprehension accuracy was high 
(M = 0.81, SD = 0.19). 
Experiment 2B 
There was some concern that Experiment 2 could not be accurately tested 
using Mechanical Turk as there would be no way to control for the brightness 
of participants’ computer monitors. To cope with this limitation, we replicated 
Experiment 2 in the lab at Erasmus University Rotterdam, using International 
Psychology students who participated for course credit. 
Method 
Participants. As the current experiment was run in the lab, we were 
constrained in the number of participants we could recruit (to a greater extent 
than on Mechanical Turk), and therefore we aimed to include 80 participants 
in the analysis. Ninety participants (23 male, mean age 20.02 years, range: 17–
29 years) were recruited from the first year International Bachelor of 
Psychology students at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, where their 
English proficiency had to be sufficient, as determined by having a TOEFL 
grade above 80. Participants were tested in the lab, which is equipped with 22-
in. TFT screens with a resolution of 1920 × 1200 and a ratio of 16:10. 
Materials. The same materials as in Experiment 2A were used. 
Design and Procedure. The design and procedure were identical to 
Experiments 1 and 2A, except that participants were tested in the lab. 
Results and Discussion 
Ten participants were excluded from further analysis: three appeared to have 
reversed the keys and seven performed below the 80% accuracy cutoff. Like 
the other experiments, use of these exclusion criteria were preregistered on the 
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OSF before data collection began. Eighty participants were included in the 
analysis. Furthermore, one item was removed from the analysis as an item 
analysis revealed an accuracy below our 80% cutoff. Fifteen experimental 
item pairs remained in the analysis. 
A paired-samples t test was conducted to investigate whether there was a 
match advantage for accuracy and RTs using a stimulus set low in contrast, 
with saturation levels reduced to a point at which the hue was still 
recognizable. The results indicated no significant difference in accuracy scores 
between the match (M = .96, SD = .07) and mismatch conditions 
(M = .95, SD= .08), t(79) = 0.62, p = .534, d = 0.07. Participants produced 
faster responses in the match than in the mismatch condition (M = 846 
ms, SD = 355 ms and M = 926 ms, SD = 548 ms, respectively), but this did not 
reach statistical significance, t????????????? p = .080, d = 0.20, BF10 = 0.55. 
Comprehension accuracy was high (M = 0.82, SD = 0.14). 
The results from Experiment 2B also support the results from Experiment 2A, 
as neither experiment found conclusive evidence for a match effect. 
Experiment 3 
To further determine the effects of reduced saturation on the match advantage, 
Experiment 3 was run using the same pictures as Experiment 1 and 2, except 
they were shown in grayscale. As no hue is present in grayscale photos, no 
significant difference between the match and mismatch condition is expected. 
Method 
Participants. Two hundred and twenty-two participants (98 males, mean age 
38.64 years, range: 19–71 years) took part in the current study, and were 
recruited from Mechanical Turk and paid $1.50 for their participation. 
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Materials. The pictures used in this experiment were adapted from those used 
in Experiment 1 such that they were depicted in gray shades (see Figure 1). 
The gray shades were achieved by changing the pictures to black and white by 
using Paint.NET software. The sentences remained unchanged. 
Design and Procedure. The design and procedure were identical to that of 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
Results and Discussion 
Forty-two participants were excluded from further analysis: Two reported that 
English was not their first language, seven appeared to have reversed the keys, 
12 performed below the 80% accuracy cutoff, and 21 last-run participants 
were removed to equate the number of subjects per list. One hundred and 
eighty participants were included in the analysis. 
A paired samples t test was conducted to investigate whether there was a 
match advantage for accuracy and RTs using pictures portrayed in grayscale. 
The results indicated that accuracy rates in the match condition 
(M = .97, SD = .06) and in the mismatch condition (M = .96, SD = .08) did not 
significantly differ, t(179) = 1.89, p = .06, d = 0.14. In the RTs there was also 
no significant difference between the match (M = 1,239 ms, SD = 641 ms) and 
mismatch conditions (M = 1,243 ms, SD = 558 ms), t(179) = 
0.21, p = .834, d = 0.02, BF10 = 0.09. Comprehension accuracy was high (M = 
0.81, SD = 0.19). 
The results of Experiment 3 suggest that, when pictures are shown completely 
in grayscale, there is no significant match advantage present. 
Exploratory Analyses 
We were interested in examining exactly how the match and mismatch 
conditions differed from each other across experiments. As such, we 
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conducted several exploratory analyses to gain a better appreciation of the 
processes that are occurring. 
We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA over the reaction time data to 
examine the differences between Experiments 1, 2A, and 3, where 
“experiment” was the between-subjects factor, and we found that there was a 
significant main effect of condition, F(1, 453) = 5.01, p = .026, and a 
significant interaction between condition and experiment, F(2, 453) = 
3.30, p = .038. No main effect of experiment was found, F(2, 453) = 
1.58, p = .207. On the basis of these results we decided to run additional 
analyses to see whether the RTs from Experiment 2A significantly differed 
from Experiments 1 and 3 per condition. A simple contrast revealed that the 
RTs in the mismatch condition were significantly faster in 
Experiment 2A, t?????????????? p= .024, than in Experiment 1. No further 
significant interactions were found (see Figure 3). 
General Discussion 
Previous research on the presence of color in mental simulations has come up 
with some contradictory findings (e.g., Connell, 2007; Zwaan & 
Pecher, 2012). One of the aims of the current study was to conclusively 
establish whether color is simulated or not. A second aim was to discover how 
much perceptual information is present in a mental simulation. Many object 
features have been studied in the past, but color is the only feature that can be 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
argued that the match advantage exists because if a picture matches the 
perceptual image in the mental simulation, then response time is facilitated. 
When there is a mismatch, this facilitation cannot occur and may instead result 
in interference, leading to longer response times. 
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Figure 3. Size of match advantage in Experiment 1, when pictures were 
shown at normal levels of saturation; Experiments 2A and 2B, when saturation 
was reduced; and Experiment 3, when all pictures were shown in grayscale. 
**p < .01. *p < .05.  
In order to successfully complete our first aim, the experiments used more 
stringent criteria for the stimuli compared to what was used by Connell (2007) 
and Zwaan and Pecher (2012), as they included some items that could change 
shape as well as color. Furthermore, the median reaction time rather than the 
mean was used, such as in the replication by Zwaan and Pecher (2012) and 
other studies using a similar paradigm, as it allowed for less data to be 
discarded and was in line with the methods of previous research. 
Experiment 1 found a significant match advantage of 104 ms, which supports 
the hypothesis that color is indeed present in mental simulations and supports 
the results by Zwaan and Pecher (2012) and Connell and Lynott (2009). In 
order to examine the richness of mental simulations and thus address our 
1414447-Mannaert_BNW.indd   42 17-01-20   16:42
Color Activation in Mental Simulations 
35 
?
second goal, Experiment 2 used items where the saturation of the color was 
reduced to the lowest point at which the hue was still recognizable. The results 
of this experiment found no significant difference between the match and the 
mismatch condition. Interestingly, however, exploratory analyses revealed that 
the RTs in the mismatch condition were significantly faster in Experiment 2A 
than in Experiment 1, while no difference was found for the match condition. 
The results from Experiment 2A therefore serve to illustrate two points: First, 
the match advantage disappears when saturation in pictures is lowered, and 
second, the reason it disappears is due to a speeding up of response time in the 
mismatch condition. These results are intriguing as they suggest that, rather 
than a picture being more of a match leading to faster response times (i.e., 
facilitation), it would suggest that the match effect appears due to there being 
a vivid difference between the pictured object and the simulation in the 
mismatch condition, leading to interference effects. 
Experiment 3 provides tentative evidence in support of this hypothesis as well, 
as the average response times of this experiment appear to fall in between 
those of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2A, although this difference does not 
reach significance. As the average difference in reaction time between 
Experiment 2A and 3 is only 8 ms, it is unrealistic to expect a significant 
difference using a between-subjects analysis. It would be interesting for future 
studies to examine, using a within-subjects paradigm, at which level of 
saturation color can aid object recognition. Although the between-subjects 
comparison in our exploratory analyses were not significant, such future 
studies could illustrate that the mere presence of color—even at the lowest 
level of saturation during which the hue is still recognizable—serves to 
enhance performance in the object-verification task. Indeed, this is supported 
by the general literature stating that color aids in object recognition (Bramão 
et al., 2011). 
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In addition to finding a match advantage in the RTs of participants in 
Experiment 1, we also found a significant reduction in accuracy in the 
mismatch condition. As we removed items that had an average accuracy 
below 80%, this reduction cannot be explained by the pictures in that 
condition not matching the sentence. The match advantage in the RTs bear no 
relation to the accuracy scores, as only the RTs of accurate responses were 
used. This reduction in accuracy scores, however, could serve to explain why 
a match effect exists at all. We previously argued that the match effect exists 
due to a vivid difference occurring in the mismatch condition between the 
pictured object and the simulation. The task participants had to complete 
required them to only examine whether the actually pictured object (with no 
instructions mentioning color) was mentioned in the previous sentence. A 
strategy that could aid in the completion of such an object-verification task—
in which speed is important—could be that participants simply judge whether 
the picture they see overlaps with what is present in the mental simulation. 
When there is a vivid difference, or no overlap, between the picture and the 
simulation, they are more likely to answer with an incorrect no response. It 
would be interesting to examine whether the removal of the instructions 
requiring speed would eliminate the difference in accuracy between the two 
conditions. 
As for the “richness” of our mental simulations, we can conclude that they are 
rich indeed, in the sense that they include multiple object properties. We 
already know that color can be decomposed into different dimensions, namely 
hue, saturation, and brightness. If the reduction in the level of one of these 
dimensions (in our study: saturation) had not reduced the match advantage, we 
would have had to argue that color would not be present or relevant in a 
mental simulation. Our study, however, found that by reducing saturation, the 
match advantage disappears. Furthermore, we found tentative evidence that 
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the mere presence of color—even with low levels of saturation—can aid in 
object recognition, compared to when color is removed entirely. 
In sum, the current study found further support that color is another object 
property that is represented in mental simulations, in addition to shape and 
orientation. Furthermore, we have shown that by reducing saturation of the 
picture shown we can remove the match advantage as well, while still being 
involved in object recognition. This leads to the conclusion that, when 
comprehending language, we build mental simulations rich in perceptual 
detail.
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How Are Mental Simulations Updated Across Sentences? 
 
This chapter has been published as: 
Hoeben Mannaert, L.N., Dijkstra, K., & Zwaan, R.A. (2019). How are mental 
simulations updated across sentences? Memory & Cognition, 47(6), 1201-
1214. doi:10.3758/s13421-019-00928-2 
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Abstract 
We examined how grounded mental simulations are updated when there is an 
implied change of shape, over the course of two (Experiment 1) and four 
(Experiment 2) sentences.  In each preregistered experiment, 84 psychology 
students completed a sentence-picture verification task in which they judged 
as quickly and accurately as possible whether the pictured object was 
mentioned in the previous sentence.  Participants had significantly higher 
accuracy scores and significantly shorter response times when pictures 
matched the shape implied by the previous sentence, than when pictures 
mismatched the implied shape.  These findings suggest that, during language 
comprehension, mental simulations can be actively updated to reflect new 
incoming information.   
Keywords: grounded cognition, mental representation, situation models, 
language comprehension, discourse, updating 
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Introduction 
Imagine you are reading a story about an eagle that is flying in the sky. The 
eagle continues to soar for a while before eventually landing in its nest and 
going to sleep. If you were to make a drawing of the eagle’s final shape, 
would the wings of the eagle be folded? Anyone with some knowledge of how 
birds rest in a nest would know that the answer to this question is “yes”, but 
would not have forgotten the bird’s initial shape. According to the perceptual 
symbol systems theory (Barsalou, 1999), during language comprehension we 
activate modal symbols that can be combined in a mental simulation, which 
may involve the same neural structures as would be used if we were to see the 
described event in real life. According to Sato, Schafer, and Bergen (2013), 
these mental simulations are formed incrementally, suggesting that, while 
reading this story about an eagle, we initially created a mental simulation of 
the eagle having spread wings as it was flying in the air, followed by the 
inclusion of an eagle with folded wings in the simulation later on. What 
remains unclear is whether or not the final object replaced the initial 
simulation, or whether both object states remain activated in that simulation.   
Although there is still some debate as to whether mental representations 
require sensorimotor input or whether amodal symbols are required (e.g., 
Mahon & Caramazza, 2008), many cognitive psychologists believe that 
sensorimotor input is required in some form to support language 
comprehension (Barsalou, 1999; 2008). Indeed, many behavioral experiments 
have shown that mental simulations can include an object’s shape (Zwaan, 
Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002), color (Hoeben Mannaert, Dijkstra, & Zwaan, 
2017; Pecher & Zwaan, 2012), orientation (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001), size 
(De Koning, Wassenburg, Bos, & Van der Schoot, 2016), and movement 
during language comprehension (Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Bertolani, Daprati, & 
Gangitano, 2000; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002).  
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In the past it has been difficult to tease apart whether the match effects found 
in word- or sentence-picture verification tasks are due to the visual system 
being utilized, or whether it is only the conceptual system being recruited for 
the task (Ostarek & Huettig, 2017). However, recent studies utilizing a 
technique called ‘continuous flash suppression’ in word-picture verification 
tasks, where the picture shown is rendered practically invisible by disrupting 
the processing of visual stimuli (Lupyan & Ward, 2013; Ostarek & Huettig, 
2017), have provided evidence that spoken words also activate low-level 
visual representations. These findings provide support for the idea that 
conceptual representations also involve the visual system. Moreover, many 
neuroimaging studies have also illustrated that modality-specific sensory, 
motor, and affective systems are involved during language comprehension 
(Binder & Desai, 2011; Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Sakreida et 
al., 2013; Simmons, Ramjee, Beauchamp, McRae, Martin, & Barsalou, et al., 
2007), illustrating that both behavioral and neuroimaging studies support the 
idea that mental simulations involve sensorimotor activation.  
Many studies have targeted the question of what is represented in a mental 
simulation, but more and more researchers are now focusing on how mental 
simulations unfold across texts and their relevance for language 
comprehension. For instance, a study by Kaup, Lüdtke, and Zwaan (2006) 
illustrated that responses to pictures that matched the situation described in a 
preceding sentence were facilitated when the sentences were affirmative (e.g. 
The umbrella was open), but only after a 750 ms delay. This facilitation was 
no longer present at 1500 ms, suggesting that the representation may have 
deactivated at that point in time. Sentences described negatively (e.g. The 
umbrella was not closed), however, only led to facilitation after a 1500 ms 
delay, but not after 750 ms. These findings provide evidence for the idea that 
mental simulations require additional processing time if sentences are 
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complex, and that these simulations can become deactivated after a period of 
time.  
Interestingly, it has also been shown that these simulations can be reactivated 
at a later point in time, if the context requires it. For example, reading 
sentences implying a certain object shape or orientation leads to faster 
responses in an object-verification task performed after a 45 minute delay, 
illustrating that a mental simulation formed during the reading of a sentence 
can be reactivated if necessary at a later point in time (Pecher, Van Dantzig, 
Zwaan, & Zeelenberg, 2009). Furthermore, several studies examining the 
influence of imperfective and perfect verb aspect have shown that mental 
simulations remain activated longer when there is a description of an ongoing 
situation (e.g., The boy was building a doghouse) compared to a description of 
a situation that has already occurred (e.g., The boy had built a doghouse) 
(Madden & Therriault, 2009; Madden & Zwaan, 2003; Magliano & Schleich, 
2000). These studies support the idea that grammatical markers provide cues 
for how a situation model should be constructed and updated.   
Radvansky and Zacks (2011; see also Zwaan & Madden, 2004) explain that 
this updating process can take various forms: firstly, a new situation model 
can be constructed (model creation); secondly, if new information is 
consistent with the current situation it can be incorporated into the existing 
model (model elaboration); thirdly, the model can be altered to accommodate 
new information (model transformation); and finally, it can merge two models 
into one (model blending). Model creation may be utilized when there is a 
shift to a new event in a narrative, for instance when a character moves from 
one location to the next (Radvansky, 2012). Model transformation occurs 
when, for example, contradictory information needs to be integrated into the 
existing situation model. For example, if a person claims to be a vegetarian, 
but subsequently eats a hamburger (cf. Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993), this would 
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require the model to be transformed to accommodate this contradiction. Model 
elaboration is what occurs when more information about the current situation 
is added without requiring a structural change (e.g., reading about a jogger in a 
marathon and eventually noticing that his shoes are blue. Model blending 
happens when initially two events are perceived to be distinct, but eventually 
are considered to be part of the same event. For example, if a man walks into 
another room to pick up his coat it may initially be perceived as an event 
boundary – and thus a separate situation model would need to be constructed. 
However, once he returns to the room he came from while putting on the coat, 
it becomes clear that the grabbing and wearing of the coat is part of an 
ongoing event, and thus, the events need to be blended into one coherent 
situation model.   
Given that there are various ways in which a situation model can be updated, 
how would mental simulations be affected during language comprehension? If 
mental simulations are simply “the reenactment of perceptual, motor, and 
introspective states acquired during experience with the world, body, and 
mind” (Barsalou, 2008, p.618), then would the process of updating a situation 
model lead to the activation of multiple states in a mental simulation, or would 
only the “final” state stay activated? If situation models are representations of 
the text that underpin language comprehension, then any changes occurring in 
a mental simulation – an important subcomponent of the situation model – 
would influence the construction of the situation model. In other words, if 
mental simulations are directly involved in the comprehension process, then 
we would expect mental simulations to update dynamically as a narrative 
unfolds. However, if mental simulations are not directly involved, but rather a 
function that activates all relevant perceptual input – which is subsequently 
distinguished by higher order cognitive processes – then it would make sense 
for all relevant perceptual input to be activated in a mental simulation. As 
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such, in order to gain a full understanding of how mental simulations are 
involved in language comprehension, it is important to find out how the 
updating process affects mental simulations. Most studies have only focused 
on situation model updating by looking at the slowdown of reading as a 
measure for this updating process, but these studies fail to provide a complete 
picture of this updating process.  
When reading about inflating a balloon, it is of course interesting to know that 
there is an increase in processing time necessary to comprehend the changes to 
the situation model, but what exactly happens to the representations described 
by that sentence? Does the initial shape of the balloon (i.e. deflated) stay 
activated as the final shape (i.e. inflated balloon) also activates? Or does the 
deflated balloon representation deactivate as the inflated balloon activates? An 
fMRI study by Hindy, Solomon, Altmann, and Thompson-Schill (2015) 
suggests that the brain does encode object state changes, using short sentence 
items such as “inflate the balloon” to investigate this. Their results suggested 
that the ventral visual cortex encodes both the initial object state (e.g., deflated 
balloon) and the final object state (e.g., inflated balloon). Furthermore, the 
authors suggest that the posterior parietal cortex may be recruited for 
conceptual binding, so that the distinct states are bound together in a stable 
representation. These findings suggest that we have to know what an initial 
object state is in order to comprehend that a change in state is occurring. 
Possibly, this could mean that when a change in an object state is described, 
that both object representations are activated in a mental simulation.  
To our knowledge, only one study thus far has explored what happens to 
mental simulations of changing object states. Sato et al. (2013) were interested 
in finding out whether mental simulations are formed incrementally (i.e., 
while reading a sentence) or after all the information has been obtained (i.e., at 
the end of the sentence). If a mental simulation is only formed once all the 
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information has been collected, then it would be unlikely for an initial object 
state to be activated. If a mental simulation is formed incrementally, however, 
multiple object states could become activated and potentially deactivated 
during the process of comprehension. To explore this, Sato et al. had 
participants read a Japanese sentence where an expectation of an object shape 
was created, but contradicted at the end of the sentence. For example, in one 
item participants read about a person wearing a yukata (a cotton kimono) to a 
fireworks festival, but the yukata had been torn apart. As Japanese is a verb-
final language, this was an ideal medium by which to create an expectation of 
an object shape (i.e. a whole yukata) and examine what a subsequent 
contradiction would do to the mental simulation of this event. In order to test 
which shape would be simulated, they used a picture verification task either 
before or after the final verb in the sentence. Their results showed that 
participants responded faster to the picture matching the shape implied both 
before and after the final verb, suggesting that mental simulations are formed 
incrementally, and that an initial shape can be deactivated in a mental 
simulation if a person is presented with information that contradicts earlier 
expectations.    
What remains unclear, however, from Sato et al.’s (2013) findings, is whether 
an initial shape activation would become deactivated in a mental simulation 
when no contradictory information is supplied. For example, when reading a 
sentence pair such as: “The eagle was moving through the air. That evening 
the eagle was resting in its nest.” the latter sentence does not contradict the 
event that took place earlier on. Instead, the eagle has spread wings while it is 
flying, which changes to an eagle having folded wings once it is resting later 
on. At the end of this sentence pair, would a person still have the initial object 
state active in a mental simulation, or would this have been deactivated? We 
are interested in finding out whether implied changes in shape lead to the 
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simultaneous activation of both object shapes, or whether only the final shape 
remains active in the mental simulation. As most studies examining situation 
model updating use reading times as a dependent variable, using a sentence-
picture verification task offers a unique way to explore how these mental 
simulations unfold, and whether this updating process requires both visual 
representations to be active simultaneously, or whether the final representation 
becomes active as the prior one deactivates. Such a task allows us to gleam 
additional information regarding the nature of mental simulation updating, 
which cannot be done with reading time tasks alone.   
The Present Study 
Two experiments were conducted to examine how mental simulations are 
updated when changes in implied shape are described over the course of 
several sentences, using a sentence-picture verification task. Participants had 
to read either two (Experiment 1) or four (Experiment 2) sentences that 
described either a change in shape (change condition) or no change in shape 
(constant condition), followed by a picture that either matched or mismatched 
the shape implied by the final sentence, where they had to decide whether the 
pictured object was mentioned in the text.  
Given that previously simulated information can be reactivated when 
necessary (Pecher et al., 2009; Sundermeier et al., 2005) and can continue to 
influence language comprehension in the future (O’Brien, Cook, & Guéraud, 
2010), it is possible that, in a context where both object states are implied 
immediately one after the other, both would remain activated in order to 
update the situation model. This could potentially occur during model 
elaboration as opposed to model creation (Radvansky & Zacks, 2011). It is 
also possible, however, that due to mental simulations being formed 
incrementally, that the initial object state is replaced immediately when the 
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second state is mentioned. This explanation would fall in line with what is 
proposed in the Event Horizon Model (Radvansky, 2012). According to the 
Event Horizon Model, a new model is created at event boundaries and could 
therefore suggest the initial object state is replaced immediately. If the newer 
object state is then activated in the new situation model, then response times 
should be shorter when the new object is displayed compared to when the first 
object is displayed. As such, if reading about a change in an object’s shape is 
considered to be an event boundary, then we can expect shorter response times 
when the picture shown matches the changed object’s shape compared to 
when it mismatches this shape. If instead the model is merely elaborated upon, 
then no differences would be expected when the picture shown matches the 
first- or last-mentioned object.  
We hypothesized that in Experiment 1, where one shape is mentioned directly 
after the other, that both shapes would remain activated in the mental 
simulation as we expected model elaboration to occur, rather than creation. 
Therefore, we predicted to find no significant differences in the response times 
between the match and mismatch condition in the shape change condition. We 
did expect a match effect in the shape constant condition, as this would be 
consistent with findings from previous studies (e.g., Zwaan et al., 2001; 
Zwaan & Pecher, 2012). In Experiment 2, however, the final object shape was 
emphasized using the final three sentences (out of four total). In this 
experiment we expected that the initial shape would become deactivated as 
more emphasis was placed on the final shape. Specifically, we predicted a 
significant match advantage in the response times in both the shape change 
and shape constant conditions in this experiment. We made no specific 
predictions regarding the accuracy scores in both Experiment 1 and 2. 
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Ethics Statement 
The participation in all experiments and in the norming study was voluntary. 
The participants subscribed to the experiments online via the university 
platform, and were told that by signing up for a study, they declare to 
voluntarily participate in this study. They were briefed with the content of 
each study but obtaining further written consent was not required by the Ethics 
Committee of Psychology at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, The 
Netherlands, who approved the project, because the experiments were non-
invasive and the data collected was processed anonymously. 
Preregistration  
The predictions, exclusion criteria, design, methods, analyses, and materials of 
all the experiments reported in this article were pre-registered in advance of 
data collection and analysis on the Open Science Framework (OSF) to ensure 
confirmatory procedures were conducted according to a priori criteria.2 
Analyses that were not pre-registered are referred to in this article under the 
heading “Exploratory Analyses”. 
Experiment 1       
Method  
Norming study. In the current study, participants read sentences where a 
certain shape is implied, rather than explicitly stated. In order to ensure that 
the sentences did imply the shape we intended them to, a norming study was 
conducted. Forty-one participants were recruited via Mechanical Turk 
(www.mturk.com) and were paid $3.50 for completion of the survey, which 
took approximately 30 minutes to complete. The participants had a mean age 
of 35.10 years (SD = 10.87) and consisted of 19 females and 22 males.  
?
? The pre-registration can be viewed on https://osf.io/f7m3q/register/565fb3678c5e4a66b5582f67 
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Participants in the norming study read 280 sentences (seven sentences were 
written for 40 different items for Experiment 1 and 2) which implied a certain 
object shape (e.g., The bat was entering the cave) and had to determine which 
of the shown pictures best matched the sentence shown. There was also an 
option where participants could state that neither picture matched the sentence 
they read and could provide comments to elaborate on their reasoning. By 
doing the norming study in this manner we could ensure that the final items 
we would end up using would actually imply the shape we wanted it imply. 
For example, for the item about an eagle, 91.30% of participants agreed that 
our matching picture corresponded to the shape implied by the sentence “the 
eagle was moving through the air”, while 82.61% agreed that our matching 
picture corresponded to the sentence “The eagle was resting in its nest”. If we 
consider an item to be the object of the sentences, then each item would lead 
to seven ratings per participant (e.g. one rating for the sentence about the eagle 
moving through the air, another rating for the sentence about the eagle resting 
in the nest, and so on). For the results, we looked at the sentence of an item 
that contained the lowest percentage of agreement across participants in order 
to be conservative in our final selection of stimuli. The results of the study 
illustrated that the stimulus set contained several items where the minimum 
average agreement on what shape matched which sentence was less than 61%. 
Furthermore, on some of the items participants made comments suggesting the 
item contained an incorrect logical match between sentence and picture. To 
improve the quality of the stimulus set and to ensure the final set contained a 
number of stimuli that was a multiple of four (due to counterbalancing), 12 
items were removed. This left us with 28 experimental items that had a 
minimum average agreement of 77.52% (SD = 7.73%) regarding which 
picture best represented which sentence. 
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Participants. We expected to need 84 participants to find an effect if it 
existed – based on a power analysis performed on the results of the Zwaan et 
al. (2002) study – and therefore continued data collection until this goal had 
been met, replacing participants that had to be excluded due to having total 
accuracy scores below 80%. As a result of this measure, only one participant 
was excluded and replaced. The final sample consisted of 84 participants 
(aged 17-29 years, Mage = 20.33, SDage = 2.04, 71 females, 13 males) who 
were students of the International Bachelor Programme of Psychology (IBP) 
at the Erasmus University Rotterdam in The Netherlands. IBP students are 
required to have a minimum level of 80 on the Test of English as a Foreign 
Language (TOEFL), or a 6.0 on the International English Language Testing 
System (IELTS), or be native speakers of English. Participants were 
reimbursed with course credit. 
Sentences. Twenty-eight experimental sentence pairs and 28 filler sentence 
pairs were used in the experiment for each experiment block. The sentence 
pairs in one block involved an implied change in shape (change condition) and 
the sentences in the other block involved no change in shape (constant 
condition). See Figure 1 for an example of the sentence stimuli.  Of the 
experimental sentence pairs, two versions were created for counterbalancing 
purposes to account for typicality effects. The first version ensured that the 
final sentence implied one of two possible object shapes (e.g., eagle – folded 
wings), while the second version ensured the final sentence implied the other 
possible shape (e.g., eagle – spread wings). To be able to counterbalance in 
this way without manipulating time aspect in the sentences, we could only use 
objects that were reversible in shape. For example, an eagle is able to fold its 
wings and then spread them again, and vice versa. An egg, however, could 
only ever start out as a whole egg and then become a fried egg, not the other 
way around. 
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 Picture 
Shape Sentence Match Mismatch 
Change The eagle was moving through 
the air. That evening the eagle 
was resting in its nest. The eagle 
continued perching in its nest. 
The eagle looked at ease in the 
nest. 
 
 
Constant The eagle was moving through 
the air. That evening the eagle 
was still moving through the air. 
The eagle continued flying in the 
air. The eagle looked at ease in 
the air. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of stimulus material used in Experiment 1 and 2 (italics). 
Experiment 2 used the first sentences from Experiment 1 and had two 
sentences added at the end to continue emphasizing one shape. Pictures under 
“Match” refer to a picture matching the shape implied by the final sentence, 
where “Mismatch” refers to a picture mismatching the shape implied by the 
final sentence. The full list of stimuli can be viewed on: 
https://mfr.osf.io/render?url=https://osf.io/3hrq8/?action=download%26mode
=render  
Pictures. Eighty-four pictures were created for use in this experiment, of 
which 56 were used for the experimental sentences, and 28 for the filler 
sentences. During the experimental procedure, each sentence pair was 
followed by a picture that either matched or mismatched the implied shape, 
thus requiring the creation of two picture versions of a particular object. For 
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example, if the sentence stated that the eagle was in the air, a picture of either 
an eagle with spread wings or a picture of an eagle with folded wings could be 
shown. The pictures were obtained from the internet (Google image search 
engine) and were edited with the Paint.NET software to be displayed as 
grayscale (to ensure that effects of color could not confound the results) to not 
exceed a 300 x 300 pixel resolution (approximately 7.9 x 7.9 cm on screen). 
The experiment was programmed using E-Prime 2.0 Professional and 
participants completed the experiments in isolated cubicles with computers 
equipped with 24.1” TFT-IPS screens with a resolution of 1920 x 1200 and a 
ratio of 16:10. 
Design and Procedure. The experiment was a 2 (match: match vs. mismatch) 
x 2 (shape: change vs. constant) x 2 (block: block 1 shown first vs. block 2 
shown first) x 2 (sentence: version 1 vs. version 2) mixed-subjects design, 
resulting in eight counterbalanced lists. ‘Match’ and ‘shape’ were tested 
within-subjects, meaning that participants viewed pictures that matched and 
mismatched implied shape, and viewed sentences that either implied a change 
in shape (change condition) or did not (constant condition). ‘Block’ and 
‘sentence’ were between-subjects variables that ensured that, firstly, half of all 
participants were shown block 1 during session 1 (containing only the change 
condition items) and then block 2 during session 2, while the other half were 
shown block 2 during session 1, followed by block 1 during session 2. 
Participants completed each session one week apart to ensure that there were 
no carryover effects from one set of materials to another. Secondly, each 
experimental sentence pair could imply one of two object states (i.e., a 
sentence implying an eagle with spread wings or a sentence implying eagle 
with folded wings). This variable was also tested between-subjects so that half 
of all participants viewed the sentence implying one of the object states and 
that the other half viewed the sentence implying the other object state. Within 
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the same block participants received each item once. We counterbalanced the 
experiment in this way to ensure that neither block order nor problems with 
typicality could be possible explanations for the results. 
Participants were instructed that they would perform a self-paced reading task 
using the spacebar and that they would see a picture after the second sentence, 
and that they must answer whether the pictured object was mentioned in the 
previous sentence. They were instructed to press the “L” key for YES 
responses and the “A” key for NO responses. Participants first received 5 
practice sentences. A trial proceeded as follows: the > sign was shown for 
1000ms in the center of the screen (left-aligned) signifying that they would 
receive a new sentence sequence. Following this, they saw the first sentence 
(left-aligned), and had to press space to signify they understood the sentence, 
before immediately seeing the second sentence on the screen. Once they 
pressed the spacebar they saw a fixation cross in the center (center-aligned) of 
the screen for 500 ms to prepare them for a response. We chose 500 ms as the 
interstimulus interval as this is commonly used in sentence-picture verification 
studies (e.g., De Koning et al., 2017; Hoeben Mannaert et al., 2017; Zwaan & 
Pecher, 2012). Following the fixation cross they saw the picture in the center 
of the screen, which remained on screen until they had given a response. All 
of the experimental items (i.e., both the match and mismatch conditions) 
required a YES response while all of the filler items required a NO response. 
Half of all filler items also ended with a comprehension question, to ensure 
they properly read the sentences, where they had to give a YES/NO response 
using the “L”/ “A” keys, respectively. 
Data Analysis. A repeated measures analysis of variance (rmANOVA) was 
conducted to test whether participants were faster in their response and 
whether they were more accurate when the picture matched than when it 
mismatched for both the change and constant conditions. Only the response 
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times for accurate responses were used in the final analysis, and the median 
reaction times were analyzed instead of the mean response times. Many 
experiments using the sentence-picture verification task use the median for the 
analyses as it eliminates the necessity to make decisions on outliers (such as 
use of cutoffs based on standard deviations, absolute RTs, or other methods) 
(Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan & Pecher, 2012). Subject analyses are 
shown with the subscript “1” (e.g., F1) and item analyses3 are shown with the 
subscript “2” (e.g., F2). 
Results 
Accuracy. Table 1 shows a summary of the descriptives for the change and 
constant conditions. The rmANOVA for accuracy demonstrated a main effect 
for ‘match’, where participants in the match condition responded more 
accurately than in the mismatch condition (F1(1,83) = 17.63, p < .001, ?2p = 
0.175; F2(1,27) = 15.79, p < .001)4. A main effect for ‘shape’ was also found, 
where participants in the shape change condition responded more accurately 
than participants in the shape constant condition (F1(1,83) = 8.71, p = .004, ?2p 
= 0.095; F2(1,27) = 4.24, p = .049). There was no significant interaction 
between ‘match’ and ‘shape’ (F1(1,83) = 0.003, p = .959; F2(1,27) = 0.21, p 
= .648). Paired-sample t-tests showed that there was a significant match effect 
in both the shape change (t1(83) = 3.59, p < .001) and the shape constant 
condition (t1(83) = 2.18, p = .032). The item analyses showed no significant 
effect of ‘picture version’ (F2(1,27) = 0.06, p = .809). ?
?
3 The item analyses were not pre-registered, but were included as part of the main analyses as this is 
conventional. 
4 These analyses excluded the counterbalancing measures such as ‘sentence version’ and ‘block order’ as 
these were not included in our pre-registered analysis plan. When included, the results for ‘match’ (F(1,76) = 
17.59, p < .001) and ‘shape’ (F(1,76) = 9.86, p = .002) remained the same. The effect sizes of the 
counterbalancing measures are not reported due to lack of theoretical relevance (Madden-Lombardi, 
Dominey, & Ventre-Dominey, 2017; Pollatsek & Well, 1995; Raaijmakers, Schrijnemakers, & Gremmen, 
1999). 
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Response time. The rmANOVA for response time (performed on correct 
responses only) found a main effect for ‘match’, where participants responded 
significantly faster when the picture matched than when it mismatched the 
shape implied by the final sentence (F1(1,83) = 10.80, p = .001, ?2p = 0.115; 
F2(1,27) = 9.95, p = .004)5. There was no significant main effect of ‘shape’ 
(F1(1,83) = 0.46, p = .502; F2(1,27) = 0.84, p = .366), nor a significant 
interaction between ‘shape’ and ‘match’ (F1(1,83) = 0.189, p = .665; F2(1,27) 
= 0.21, p = .654). Paired-sample t-tests showed that participants were 
significantly faster in the match condition in both the shape change (t1(83) = -
2.51, p = .014) and the shape constant condition (t1(83) = -2.02, p?= .047). 
There was also a significant effect of ‘picture version’ in the item analyses 
(F2(1,27) = 4.72, p = .039).?
Exploratory analyses.  
Comprehension accuracy. To examine whether participants did properly read 
both sentences in the experiment, the accuracy scores to the comprehension 
questions were analyzed. Sixteen comprehension questions focused on the 
final sentence in the pair, while 12 questions focused on the first sentence in 
the pair. Average comprehension accuracy was high at 89.07% (SD = 12.20%) 
for questions focused on the first sentence as well as for questions targeted at 
the second sentence (M = 88.69%, SD = 11.61%). A paired samples t-test 
found no significant difference between comprehension accuracy for questions 
targeting sentence one and sentence two (t(83) = .31, p = .761).   
Discussion 
As can be seen from Table 1, overall accuracy of participants was high in each 
condition. However, even though it was high, participants still responded less 
?
??These analyses excluded the counterbalancing measures such as ‘sentence version’ and ‘block order’ as 
these were not included in our pre-registered analysis plan. When included, the results for ‘match’ (F(1,76) = 
10.36, p = .002) and ‘shape’ (F(1,76) = .65, p = .424) remained the same.?
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accurately when the picture mismatched the final object shape in both the 
change condition (2% difference) and the constant condition (3% difference). 
The participants’ task was to respond as quickly and accurately as possible 
whether the pictured object was mentioned in the previous sentence. Even 
though this was clearly the case, participants still responded in such a way 
that, when the picture mismatched the implied shape, they were slightly less 
likely to press the ‘YES’ response. This could suggest that participants are 
more inclined to match the picture they see to the image that is present in their 
mental simulation, rather than compare it to the textbase. Furthermore, 
participants also responded slightly more accurately in the shape change 
condition compared to the shape constant condition. The Event Horizon 
Model (Radvansky, 2012) provides a potential explanation for this effect. 
According to this model, memory is enhanced during the perception of an 
event boundary. As such, it could be that the change condition led to the 
perception of an event boundary, but that this was not the case when there was 
no implied change in shape. However, the fact that these percentage 
differences are so small limits the overall strength of these conclusions.  
We also found a standard match effect for both the shape change and constant 
conditions, which went against our expectations. The results suggest that the 
most recently implied shape is more highly activated than the first-mentioned 
shape in situations that involve a change in shape. What this suggests is that 
mental simulations appear to update in a manner that replaces the initially 
simulated object, rather than activating both objects in unison. This would 
mean that, although an object can be reactivated when necessary (such as in 
Pecher et al., 2009), this is not required for the purpose of updating mental 
simulations.  
Additionally, it looks as though the updating process does not seem to take 
additional cognitive effort during object changes compared to when there is no 
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change occurring, as no significant differences in response times were found 
between the change and constant conditions. It is also possible, however, that 
no differences were found between the change and constant conditions 
because both required model creation, as the sentence items included a time 
shift, which has been related to slowdown of reading times in past studies 
(e.g., Speer & Zacks, 2005) and thus could have also influenced response 
times during object-verification.   
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 illustrated that the final implied object shape is more activated 
in a mental simulation than the initial one. In Experiment 2 we wanted to see 
whether this result would replicate using four sentences instead of two. Most 
studies using the sentence-picture verification paradigm only examine the 
match effect using one sentence, therefore it is of interest to see whether this 
effect holds out under more natural conditions. To test this, the same stimuli 
were used as in the Experiment 1, except that two more sentences were added 
to increase the time between the activation of the initial shape and the 
response. Thus, in each item, the first sentence implied one shape of an object, 
whereas the final three sentences implied either another shape of that object 
(i.e., in the shape change condition) or again the same shape (i.e., in the shape 
constant condition). We expected to find a match advantage for both the shape 
constant and the shape change conditions in Experiment 2.  
Method 
Participants. We again aimed to have 84 participants in our sample, and 
therefore continued data collection until this goal had been met, replacing 
participants that had to be excluded due to having total accuracy scores below 
80%. As a result of this measure, seven participants were excluded and 
replaced. The final sample consisted of 84 participants (aged 18-47 years, Mage 
= 21.08, SDage = 4.32, 62 females) who were IBP students at the Erasmus 
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University Rotterdam in The Netherlands, and had a minimum level of 80 on 
the TOEFL, or a 6.0 on the IELTS. Participants were reimbursed with course 
credit. 
Materials. The sentence items contained four sentences. The first two 
sentences of the item were identical to the ones from Experiment 1. The final 
two sentences continued implying the shape mentioned in the second sentence. 
Aside from this change in the stimuli, all materials were the same as that of 
Experiment 1. An example of the stimuli can be seen in Figure 1. 
Design and procedure. The design and procedure of Experiment 2 were the 
same as that of Experiment 1. 
Results 
Accuracy. The data from Experiment 2 were analyzed using the same method 
as in Experiment 1. Table 1 shows a summary of the descriptives for the 
change and constant conditions. The rmANOVA for accuracy found a main 
effect for ‘match’, where participants in the match condition responded more 
accurately than in the mismatch condition (F1(1,83) = 13.81, p < .001, ?2p = 
0.14; F2(1,27) = 11.90, p = .002)6. A main effect for ‘shape’ was also found in 
the subject analyses (but not in the item analyses), where participants in the 
shape change condition responded more accurately than participants in the 
shape constant condition (F1(1,83) = 4.09, p = .046, ?2p = 0.05; F2(1,27) = 
3.57, p = .069). There was also a significant interaction between ‘match’ and 
‘shape’ (F1(1,83) = 4.74, p = .032, ?2p = 0.05; F2(1,27) = 8.63, p = .007). 
Paired-sample t-tests showed that the match effect was significant for both the 
shape change (t1(83) = 2.34, p = .022) and the shape constant condition (t1(83) 
?
??These analyses excluded the counterbalancing measures such as ‘sentence version’ and ‘block order’ as 
these were not included in our pre-registered analysis plan. When included, the results for ‘match’ (F(1,76) = 
14.19, p < .001 ), ‘shape’ (F(1,76) = 4.06, p = .047), and the interaction between ‘match’ and ‘shape’ (F(1,76) 
= 4.78, p = .032) remained the same.?
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= 3.36, p = .001).  There was no significant effect of ‘picture version’ 
(F2(1,27) = 0.53, p =.473).?
Response time. The rmANOVA for response time (performed on correct 
responses only) found a main effect for ‘match’ in the subject analyses (but 
not in the item analyses), where participants responded significantly faster 
when the picture matched than when it mismatched the shape implied by the 
final sentence (F1(1,83) = 5.54, p = .021, ?2p = 0.06; F2(1,27) = 2.28, p 
= .143)7. There was no significant main effect of ‘shape’ (F1(1,83) = 0.25, p 
= .615; F2(1,27) = 0.08, p = .776), nor a significant interaction between 
‘shape’ and ‘match’ (F1(1,83) = 0.22, p = .638; F2(1,27) = 1.10, p = .304). 
Paired-sample t-tests illustrated no significant match effect for the shape 
change condition (t1(83) = -1.99, p = .050) and the shape constant condition 
(t1(83) = -1.21, p = .228). Figure 2 illustrates a boxplot comparison of the 
response times per condition for Experiment 1 and 2. There was also no 
significant effect of ‘picture version’ (F2(1,27) = 0.09, p = .772). 
?
??These analyses excluded the counterbalancing measures such as ‘sentence version’ and ‘block order’ as 
these were not included in our pre-registered analysis plan. When included, the results for ‘match’ (F(1,76) = 
4.75, p = .032), and ‘shape’ (F(1,76) = 0.07  p = .797) remained the same.?
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Figure 2. Box plot illustrating a comparison of response times and spread of 
data for Experiment 1 and 2.  
 
Exploratory analyses. 
Meta-analysis. We performed a meta-analysis on the data to examine the 
evidence for a match effect existing in the shape change and shape constant 
conditions (see Figure 3). The meta-analysis was performed using R 3.3.2 (R 
Core Team, 2016) using the package metafor (Viechtbauer, 2010). The code 
can be viewed in the Appendix. The results illustrated a 29.31 ms match 
advantage in the shape change condition, and a 20.66 ms match advantage in 
the shape constant condition, both significant (p = .0014 and p = .025, 
respectively) providing overall support for the notion that comprehenders do 
actively update their mental simulations.  
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Figure 3. Meta-analysis of Experiments 1 and 2 
 
1414447-Mannaert_BNW.indd   70 17-01-20   16:42
  Ta
bl
e 
1 
 N
ot
e.
 R
es
po
ns
e 
tim
es
 a
re
 sh
ow
n 
in
 m
s. 
R
ep
or
te
d 
ef
fe
ct
 si
ze
s 
ar
e 
fo
r t
he
 c
om
pa
ris
on
 o
f r
es
po
ns
e 
tim
e.
 B
ay
es
 F
ac
to
rs
 w
er
e 
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
 u
si
ng
 a
 C
au
ch
y 
pr
io
r o
f 0
.7
07
 a
s a
 o
ne
-s
id
ed
 B
ay
es
ia
n 
pa
ire
d 
sa
m
pl
es
 t-
te
st
, u
si
ng
 th
e 
JA
SP
 so
ftw
ar
e 
(v
er
si
on
 
0.
9.
0.
1)
 fo
r t
he
 c
al
cu
la
tio
ns
.
O
ve
rv
ie
w
 o
f M
at
ch
 E
ffe
ct
s i
n 
Ex
pe
ri
m
en
ts
 1
 a
nd
 2
 
 
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
 
R
es
po
ns
e 
Ti
m
e 
 
M
at
ch
 
M
 (S
D
) 
M
is
m
at
ch
 
M
 (S
D
) 
 
M
at
ch
 
M
 (S
D
) 
M
is
m
at
ch
 
M
 (S
D
) 
Ef
fe
ct
 si
ze
 
(C
oh
en
’s
 
d z
) 
BF
10
 
E
xp
er
im
en
t 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
ha
ng
e 
0.
97
 (0
.0
5)
 
0.
95
 (0
.0
7)
 
 
57
2.
90
 (1
50
.2
0)
 
60
7.
50
 (2
24
.5
0)
 
-0
.2
7 
4.
52
  
C
on
st
an
t 
0.
95
 (0
.0
9)
 
0.
92
 (0
.0
8)
 
 
58
8.
60
 (1
81
.3
0)
 
61
4.
80
 (1
81
.5
0)
 
-0
.2
2 
1.
62
   
E
xp
er
im
en
t 2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
ha
ng
e 
0.
97
 (0
.0
5)
 
0.
95
 (0
.0
6)
 
 
65
5.
00
 (2
33
.6
0)
 
67
9.
60
 (2
68
.4
0)
 
-0
.2
2 
1.
53
  
C
on
st
an
t 
0.
97
 (0
.0
5)
  
0.
91
 (0
.1
4)
  
 
64
6.
60
 (2
27
.9
0)
 
66
2.
40
 (2
64
.8
0)
 
-0
.1
3 
0.
43
   
1414447-Mannaert_BNW.indd   71 17-01-20   16:42
Mental Simulation Updating 
?
64 
?
Comprehension accuracy. To examine whether participants did properly read 
the sentences in the experiment, the accuracy scores to the comprehension 
questions were analyzed. Sixteen comprehension questions focused on the 
second sentence, while 12 questions focused on the first sentence. Average 
comprehension accuracy was high at 85.42% (SD = 10.97%) for questions 
focused on the first sentence as well as for questions targeted at the second 
sentence (M = 80.58%, SD = 10.72%). A paired samples t-test found that 
participants were significantly more accurate on questions targeting the first 
sentence compared to the second sentence (t(83) = 3.96, p < .001).  
Mismatch accuracy. To further examine the interaction found in the accuracy 
scores, we performed a paired-samples t-test to see whether the difference in 
mismatch accuracy between the shape constant and shape change conditions 
were significant. The results showed that, when the picture mismatched the 
shape implied, participants were significantly more accurate in the shape 
change condition (M = .95, SD = .06) than in the shape constant condition (M 
= .91, SD = .14, t(83) = 2.37, p = .020).  
Discussion 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to find out whether the updating of mental 
simulations still takes place when participants read four sentences, where the 
first sentence implies one shape, and the final three imply another. The 
analysis of the accuracy scores revealed an interesting pattern, where 
participants were most accurate in the match condition, regardless of whether 
the sentences implied a change in shape or not, but were significantly less 
accurate in the mismatch condition, which interacted with the shape condition. 
Inspecting the data more closely, it appears that participants were more 
accurate in the mismatch condition when a change in shape was implied 
compared to when no change was implied. It is possible that this finding is due 
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to enhanced memory during event boundaries as proposed by the Event 
Horizon Model, but then we would have expected to also find better accuracy 
in match condition when a change in shape was implied, which we did not. An 
alternative explanation for this finding is that participants in the shape constant 
condition experienced a continued reinforcement of a single shape (e.g., an 
eagle with spread wings) over the course of four sentences. If they are then 
confronted with a picture that displays a shape that does not overlap with what 
is present in their mental simulation, they are more likely to state that the 
pictured object was not mentioned in the previous sentences. In the shape 
change condition this would not be the case, as both shapes would have been 
mentioned in the sentences, resulting in slightly higher accuracy scores. 
Similar to Experiment 1, however, given that the differences in percentage 
accuracy is so small between conditions, these conclusions should be 
interpreted with necessary caution. 
The analysis for response times in Experiment 2 did not show the interaction 
found for accuracy scores. Instead, only a main match effect was found for 
subjects, where participants were again faster at responding when the picture 
matched the shape implied by the final sentence than when it mismatched. The 
paired samples t-test, however, illustrated no significant match effect in the 
shape change and constant conditions. Similarly, the item analyses found no 
significant match effect. We expect that these findings may be explained by 
the less natural wording of the sentences in the shape constant condition. 
Although we had aimed to create more realistic stimuli by adding more 
sentences, it is possible that our manipulation caused the opposite effect. The 
continued emphasis of only one shape throughout all four sentences may have 
encouraged a surface-level representation, which may have resulted in a 
weaker activation of all relevant visual representations, leading to a lack of a 
match effect. Nevertheless, when we conducted a meta-analysis over the data 
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from Experiment 1 and 2, we found a significant match effect of 29.31 ms for 
the shape change condition, and a significant match effect of 20.66 ms for the 
shape constant condition. This again supports the idea that mental simulations 
can be actively updated.  
Finally, we found that participants were significantly more accurate on the 
comprehension questions targeting the first sentence compared to those 
targeting the second sentence. It is possible that this could be explained by the 
primacy effect, being that items coming first are remembered better than those 
that come directly afterward.     
General Discussion 
Over the past decade, much research has been conducted to find out which 
object properties are represented in mental simulations. Recently, however, 
more and more researchers have become interested in understanding what the 
underlying mechanisms of mental simulations are and how they unfold during 
language comprehension. We were specifically interested in how mental 
simulations update when a change in shape is implied over the course of two 
(Experiment 1) and four (Experiment 2) sentences, using a sentence-picture 
verification task to test this. We hypothesized that, if you imply one object 
shape in one sentence, and then imply the other in the sentence that follows, 
both shapes would remain active in a mental simulation, leading to no match 
advantage. We further hypothesized that, when more sentences are added that 
continue to emphasize the final object shape, only the final shape will remain 
active in a mental simulation, leading to a match advantage.  
Our findings do not support our first hypothesis and provide tentative support 
for our second hypothesis. We found a significant match effect across the 
shape change and shape constant conditions in both Experiments 1 and 2. 
Upon closer investigation, we found that both the shape change and shape 
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constant conditions in Experiment 1 had a significant match effect, but neither 
condition was significant in Experiment 2. In order to determine whether the 
most recent shape is more activated in the mental simulation when a change in 
shape is implied, a meta-analysis was conducted over the data from both 
experiments. The findings from the meta-analysis support the conclusion that 
participants have the final shape more activated in the mental simulation, with 
an overall match advantage of 29.31 ms.  
During the process of language comprehension, a comprehensive situation 
model is built that results in the same (or similar) sensorimotor activation as 
when the described event is experienced. In a task where participants are 
asked to compare what they see in the picture to what they have read, it would 
be possible for them to either compare the picture to the surface structure of 
the text, or to compare it to the constructed situation model. In the first case, 
we would not expect a difference between any conditions as we tried to avoid 
making explicit references to object shapes. If the picture is compared at the 
level of the situation model, however, we would expect the matching picture 
to lead to faster responses, as the situation model includes all other 
information that is not only explicitly mentioned in the text (but is still 
relevant to the aspects of the situation). This is indeed what we found in the 
current study. If the sentence-picture verification task causes us to compare 
the viewed picture to our constructed situation model, it would make sense 
that, when there is overlap between the two, we are more likely to answer 
“yes” in the context of this task. This then also explains why accuracy was 
higher in the shape change condition, as the picture will always overlap with 
one of the implied shapes. In the shape constant condition, however, there are 
more constraints on what the object shape could be, so if there is less overlap 
between picture and model (i.e., in the mismatch condition), it makes sense 
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that there are fewer people who would choose to answer in favor of the picture 
having been mentioned in the previous sentence.  
An alternative explanation to this boosted accuracy effect in the shape change 
condition comes from the Event Horizon Model (Radvansky, 2012), which 
proposes that memory is enhanced at event boundaries. Although we cannot 
conclude that there were event boundaries in between the sentences of the 
shape change condition as this was not tested, if participants indeed perceive 
the two different object shapes described in the text as separate events (i.e., 
model creation, cf. Radvansky & Zacks, 2011), it would explain why there 
was enhanced accuracy in this condition.  
In the introduction, we stated that it makes sense that mental representations 
can be reactivated at a later point in time if the context requires it (e.g., Pecher 
et al., 2009; Sundermeier et al., 2005). Indeed, if the comprehender cannot 
reactivate a previously encountered object state, then an explicit understanding 
of changes involving that state would become difficult to grasp. However, our 
results seem to suggest that for the purposes of updating mental simulations, 
no reactivation of prior object states are necessary.   
The results from the current study support the idea that mental simulations are 
updated when there is an implied change in object shape. At this point we 
cannot determine whether our results are inconsistent with those reported by 
Hindy et al. (2015), who concluded in an fMRI study that both the initial 
object state (e.g., deflated balloon) and the final object state (e.g., inflated 
balloon) are encoded when an object changes shape in a sentence (e.g., 
“inflate the balloon”), as it is possible that there would still be some activation 
of the initial object state left. Our results do support the findings of Sato et al. 
(2013), who reported that mental simulations can be updated when 
participants receive information contradictory to the initially simulated shape.  
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Now that it has been established that mental simulations change the activation 
levels of the object traces during the process of updating, future research could 
focus on how much of the initial object trace remains activated when there is 
new incoming information, which could be investigated by increasing the ISI 
between the final sentence and the picture. Furthermore, it may prove 
beneficial to replicate the current study to improve the reliability of these 
findings. 
Limitations 
The current study has a few limitations that may limit the strength of our 
conclusions. Although the current study used more sentences than typically 
used in a sentence-picture verification paradigm with the intent to create more 
natural discourse, the stimuli used could still be considered impoverished 
textoids compared to that of common discourse seen in everyday life, which 
limits the generalizability of our findings (Graesser, Millis, & Zwaan, 1997). 
Additionally, due to the difficulty in the creation of items that both change and 
reverse shape it is possible that several items may refer to an object’s shape 
more explicitly than others, though we did our best to ensure that this was not 
the case. As such, it would be prudent for future studies to continue trying to 
improve the quality of the texts used in experiments. 
A second potential limitation to this study are the task demands of a sentence-
picture verification task, as there is some debate as to whether this paradigm 
encourages explicit visual processing, and that by extension, outside of this 
experimental setting, the nature of these representations would vary. Indeed, 
sentence-picture verification tasks on their own are unlikely to be valid in 
terms of the conclusions that can be made regarding visual representations. 
However, there are many studies that have found match effects using various 
methods, such as electroencephalography (Coppens, Gootjes, & Zwaan, 
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2012), memory tasks (Pecher et al., 2009), and naming tasks (Zwaan et al., 
2002), which all support the idea that the visual system is recruited during 
language comprehension.   
A final limitation to our study is that the comprehension questions we asked 
the participants were not equally targeting sentences one and two, and that a 
significant difference was found in the comprehension accuracies between the 
two sentences in Experiment 2. Although comprehension accuracy was not a 
variable of interest to us during the design of this experiment, those results are 
still relevant, as the significant difference in comprehension accuracy could 
imply that participants read the first sentence more carefully than the 
remaining sentences in that item. However, as the number of questions was 
unbalanced with regard to the sentence’s serial position (i.e., 12 questions 
targeting sentence one versus 16 questions targeting sentence two), strong 
conclusions cannot be drawn here. We can conclude that overall 
comprehension accuracy was high in both Experiments 1 and 2, suggesting 
that participants read the items. Furthermore, it is unlikely that we would have 
found the effects we did in the current study if participants had not read the 
other sentences in each item. Future studies, however, should ensure that 
comprehension questions equally target the various sentences in an item, so 
this can be explicitly tested.   
We can conclude that mental simulations can be updated after changes in 
shape are implied across several sentences, and that this most likely occurs 
through the activation of the final shape and the deactivation of the initial 
shape. Future research could focus on how much of the initial object trace 
remains activated when there is a change occurring in a narrative. 
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Appendix 
The meta-analysis was performed using R 3.3.2 (R Core Team, 2016) using 
the package metafor (Viechtbauer, 2010) with the following code: 
library(metafor) 
# Definition of vectors 
version <- c("change", "change", "constant", "constant") 
experiment <- c("Experiment 1", "Experiment 2", "Experiment 1", 
"Experiment 2") 
mmatch <- c(573, 655, 589, 647) 
sdmatch <- c(150, 234, 181, 228) 
mmismatch <- c(608, 680, 615, 662) 
sdmismatch <- c(225, 268, 182, 265) 
n <- c(84, 84, 84, 84) 
corr <- c(.84, .91, .79, .89) 
#Creation of data frame 
data <- data.frame(version, experiment, mmatch, sdmatch, mmismatch, 
sdmismatch, n, corr, stringsAsFactors = FALSE) 
data      
#Random-effects meta-analysis of all data 
dat <- escalc(measure="MC", slab=experiment, m1i=mmatch, sd1i=sdmatch, 
m2i=mmismatch, sd2i=sdmismatch, ni=n, ri=corr,  
              data=data) 
res <- rma(yi, vi, data=dat) 
res 
#Forest plot of all data 
par(cex=.8, font=1) 
forest(res, slab=experiment, ilab=cbind(data$mmatch,data$mmismatch), 
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       ilab.xpos=c(-100,-75), xlab="Match Advantage", ylim=c(-1, 
12),rows=c(3:2, 8:7)) 
par(cex=.8, font=1) 
text(-135, c(9,4), c("Constant", "Change")) 
text(-100, 11, "Match") 
text(-75, 11, "Mismatch") 
text(75, 11, "Diff. [95% CI]") 
par("usr") 
#Random-effects meta-analysis of Change condition 
dat <- escalc(measure="MC", m1i=mmatch, sd1i=sdmatch, m2i=mmismatch, 
sd2i=sdmismatch, ni=n, ri=corr,  
              data=data, subset=(version=="change")) 
res.change <- rma(yi, vi, data=dat) 
res.change 
#Adding polygon for Change condition 
addpoly(res.change, row=1, cex=.75, mlab="RE Model for Change") 
#Random-effects meta-analysis of Constant condition 
dat <- escalc(measure="MC", m1i=mmatch, sd1i=sdmatch, m2i=mmismatch, 
sd2i=sdmismatch, ni=n, ri=corr,  
              data=data, subset=(version=="constant")) 
res.constant <- rma(yi, vi, data=dat) 
res.constant 
#Adding polygon for Constant condition 
addpoly(res.constant, row=6, cex=.75, mlab="RE Model for Constant") 
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Situation Model Updating in Young and Older Adults 
This chapter has been published as: 
Hoeben Mannaert, L. N., Dijkstra, K. (2019). Situation model updating in 
young and older adults. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 1-
8. doi:10.1177/0165025419874125 
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Abstract 
Over the past decade or so, developments in language comprehension research 
in the domain of cognitive aging have converged on support for resilience in 
older adults with regard to situation model updating when reading texts. 
Several studies have shown that even though age-related declines in language 
comprehension appear at the level of the surface form and text base of the text, 
these age differences do not apply to the creation and updating of situation 
models. In fact, older adults seem more sensitive to certain manipulations of 
situation model updating. This article presents a review of theories on 
situation model updating as well how they match with research on situation 
model updating in younger and older adults. Factors that may be responsible 
for the resilience of language comprehension in older age will be discussed as 
well as avenues for future research.  
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Introduction 
Cognitive aging research has been developing as a discipline in its own right 
over the past four decades. After an initial focus on age-related deficits in 
cognitive functions and processing speed (Salthouse, 1996), research has 
recently shifted toward the examination of preserved cognitive skills in 
language comprehension in older adults8, specifically with regard to situation 
models (Radvansky & Dijkstra, 2007). There have been developments in 
approaches with regard to the representation of texts as well. Initially, three 
levels of representation were identified: the surface form, which refers to the 
exact words and syntax used; the propositional text base, which involves the 
abstract representation of the ideas in the text; and the situation model, which 
is the mental representation of the events described in a text (Van Dijk & 
Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Successful comprehension of a 
text is considered to be the product of the creation and maintenance of an 
accurate situation model (Radvansky, 1999). Since the introduction to the 
concept of situation models (Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983), many theories have 
been developed to explain not only how situation models are created but how 
they are updated as well. Readers create a new situation model whenever they 
encounter a change in the text and this is where updating of the situation 
model takes place. 
Together, these developments provide better insight into the underlying 
mechanisms on situation model updating, either as a way to update changes 
gradually, taking one change at a time into account, or in a more global 
manner that keeps track of all of the available information in the changed 
situation. These developments also contribute to our understanding of how 
situation model updating occurs in young adult and older populations. The 
?
8 Older adults are defined here as healthy adults age 60 and up without diagnoses of memory 
impairments  
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following section describes several of these prominent theories on situation 
model updating to provide an explanation of how situation models are 
updated, before we turn to how aging affects situation model updating. We 
limit ourselves to those theories that focus on updating processes as a result of 
a change in dimension(s) and whose predictions also have been tested in 
empirical research that included younger9 and older readers.10    
Theories on Situation Model Updating 
According to the event segmentation theory by Radvansky and Zacks (2011), 
to make sense of the complex and ever-changing world we live in, people 
segment ongoing perceptual activity into separate events (Kurby & Zacks, 
2008). An event here is referring to a “segment of time at a given location that 
is conceived by an observer to have a beginning and an end,” for example, 
brushing your hair (Kurby & Zacks, 2008, p. 72). Event segmentation is 
considered to be a cognitive process that creates these event models and is 
thought to result from the perceptual system trying to make predictions about 
the future. During an ongoing event, there exists a stable state that involves 
both perceptual predictions and the error monitoring of these predictions. As 
such, while an event is still ongoing (e.g., brushing your hair), it is reasonably 
easy to predict what will happen within that environment (e.g., looking at the 
mirror while brushing). Once these predictions are no longer accurate, an 
event boundary is perceived and the event model needs to be updated to 
accommodate the new information (e.g., leaving the house). 
So when and how are these event boundaries perceived? According to the 
event-indexing model proposed by Zwaan, Langston, and Graesser (1995; see 
?
9 We define younger readers as adults, generally between the ages of 18-30 years of age.  
10 This means that certain theories, such as the memory-based text processing view (see McKoon, 
Gerrig, & Greene, 1996), the RI-Val model (Cook & O’Brien, 2014), and the Event Horizon Model 
(Radvansky, 2012) are not part of this review.??
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also Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998), readers track five dimensions of any 
situation: time, location, objects and characters, causal relationships, and 
intentions of protagonists. During the reading process, comprehenders monitor 
story events to see if the situation needs updating. Continuation of the event 
would be the default mode but whenever there is a discontinuation as the 
result of a change in any of the five dimensions, the current situation is 
deactivated and a new situation model is created (Zwaan, Langston, & 
Graesser, 1995). This process is associated with longer reading times as 
understanding the text becomes more time-consuming to accommodate the 
updating of the situation model. 
There is much empirical support for the notion that updating occurs as a result 
of changes in the events in a narrative. A recent study by Hoeben Mannaert, 
Dijkstra, and Zwaan (2019) illustrated that when a text describes a change 
occurring to an object’s shape, participants deactivate the initial object states 
in their mental representations, while the newer object state becomes active, 
suggesting that situation models do not require the activation of all associated 
information, but only that which is required for the active model. Additionally, 
studies have found that memory for an event is worse once a person crosses an 
event boundary, such as going through a door into another room (Radvansky 
& Copeland, 2006, 2010; Radvansky, Krawietz, & Tamplin, 2011), suggesting 
that the creation of a new situation model may interfere with a previous one. 
Further evidence for this interference between separate situation models 
comes from studies examining the fan effect (Anderson, 1974), which is the 
increase in the response times or error rates as a result of an increasing number 
of associations between concepts. Research has shown that when multiple 
situation models are created by referring to the presence of an object at 
separate locations, this fan effect occurs (Radvansky, 2005; Radvansky, 
O’Rear, & Fisher, 2017). However, when various objects are described as 
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being in the same location, this fan effect does not occur. This shows that the 
integration of information into an existing situation model requires less 
cognitive effort than when new situation models need to be created. 
Many studies have shown that changes on any of the five dimensions as 
proposed by the event-indexing model requires the situation model to update, 
evidenced by the longer reading times when spatial (Radvansky & Copeland, 
2006, 2010; Radvansky et al., 2011), temporal (Radvansky & Copeland, 
2010), or changes in causality, protagonists, objects, or motivations occur 
(Zwaan, Radvansky, Hilliard, & Curiel, 1998). Moreover, a study by 
McNerney, Goodwin, and Radvansky (2011) showed that situation model 
updating occurs not only in brief sentences created by experimenters but also 
when reading an entire novel, suggesting that situation model updating occurs 
during language comprehension in a naturalistic context and not simply in the 
context of an experiment. 
Although both the event segmentation theory and the event-indexing model 
state that model updating occurs when changes are made to any of the five 
dimensions we discussed in the previous section, Kurby and Zacks (2012) 
argue that each theory proposes a distinct mechanism by which this updating 
occurs. According to them, the event-indexing model assumes incremental 
updating in situation models after a change occurs in any of the five 
dimensions. This incremental updating means that the model is continuously 
updated. Conversely, the event segmentation theory suggests that updating 
generally occurs globally (Kurby & Zacks, 2012), meaning that new models 
are created at event boundaries. These event models are kept in a stable state 
that is resistant to updating, as this would interfere with the prediction 
processes inherent to the model. These predictions are consistently compared 
to what is happening in a narrative (Kurby & Zacks, 2012). Once these 
predictions are no longer accurate and an increase in error is observed within 
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the model, the model is abandoned and a new one is constructed. To 
summarize, the event-indexing model proposes an incremental updating 
mechanism, meaning that the model is continuously elaborated, while the 
event segmentation theory proposes a global updating mechanism, which 
argues that new models are created at event boundaries. 
Are these two updating mechanisms mutually exclusive? Kurby and Zacks 
(2012) argue they might not be. Indeed, the mental representations of an 
ongoing narrative may be updated within one event (i.e., incremental 
updating) and may be updated entirely at event boundaries (i.e., global 
updating). Considering the fact that many studies have provided evidence for 
incremental updating or global updating, it seems natural to assume that both 
of these processes in fact exist (see Gernsbacher, 1997, for an overview). 
However, Kurby and Zacks (2012) argue that these processes have always 
been examined in isolation and that much of the evidence provided for 
incremental updating could in fact be interpreted as global updating occurring, 
and vice versa. 
Kurby and Zacks (2012) found evidence of both incremental and global 
updating in an experiment in which participants performed think-aloud 
exercises where they typed their thoughts after finishing reading a clause and 
also had to segment the narrative into either short- or long-timescale events. 
Participants were more likely to mention characters, objects, space, and time 
when these changed in the narrative, illustrating the presence of incremental 
updating. Furthermore, event boundaries were significantly associated with 
the mention of characters, time, causation, and goal dimensions (but not for 
objects and space), providing evidence for global updating. Given that both 
global and incremental updating seem to occur in situation models, the authors 
conclude that neither the event segmentation theory nor the event-indexing 
model can independently explain how situation models are updated as they 
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only consider one form of updating. Clearly, discovering whether the various 
dimensions that are tracked during language comprehension are updated using 
different updating mechanisms is an important next step for future research in 
this area. 
Having concluded that the updating of situation models can occur both 
globally and incrementally, what can be said about where situation model 
construction takes place? Most models agree that situation models are built 
within working memory and that updating works via an interplay between 
working and long-term memory. Both the event segmentation theory and the 
event-indexing model state that working memory contains retrieval cues for 
long-term memory (Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007; Zwaan 
& Radvansky, 1998). Situation models contain too much information to be 
stored and manipulated in short-term working memory alone, thus information 
in the narrative must be rapidly encoded into long-term memory (Zacks et al., 
2007). This information can then easily be retrieved from long-term memory, 
as long as a part of the information is still available in working memory, with 
the help of retrieval cues. As such, in order for a situation model to be 
updated, a continuous interaction between working- and long-term memory 
processes is required. 
To summarize, although there is evidence to suggest that updating occurs both 
incrementally and globally (e.g., Kurby & Zacks, 2012), more studies are 
required to establish exactly at which points in a narrative updating occurs, 
and whether updating differs for the five dimensions that are tracked during 
the reading of a narrative (i.e., time, space, characters and objects, goals, and 
causation). Given that (changes in) situation models contain too much 
information to be held temporarily in memory, working memory capacity and 
links with long-term memory are important for effective updating processes to 
occur. Here, the role of aging processes becomes particularly relevant as older 
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adults may deal with situation model updating differently than young adults as 
a function of changes in their cognitive development. 
Situation Model Updating in Younger and Older Adults 
The discussion of theories on situation model updating focused on the 
mechanisms responsible for this process. These theories differ with respect to 
how and when these updating processes take place. Relevant for this review is 
how these theories may explain (differential) situation model updating 
processes in younger and older adults, possibly as a result of differences in 
cognitive developments across the life span (Zacks, Hasher, & Li, 2000). For 
example, older adults experience declines in some cognitive domains which 
may have repercussions for their ability to process and update information 
when reading. At the same time, other cognitive abilities are preserved or 
continue to develop in older age which may affect language comprehension 
processes in a more positive sense (Radvansky & Dijkstra, 2007). Below, 
areas of cognitive decline and preservation in language comprehension in 
older adults are discussed in the context of research illustrating how this has 
been demonstrated empirically in cohort comparisons of younger and older 
readers. After the areas of cognitive decline and preservation, as well as their 
impact on situation model updating have been discussed, the focus will turn to 
the issue of how these findings may or may not support the models on 
situation model updating discussed above. 
One known area of cognitive decline in older adults is speed of processing 
(Salthouse, 1996). Processing of information occurs at a slower speed in older 
relative to younger adults and accounts for a substantial portion of age-related 
decline on various cognitive tasks (Salthouse, 1996). In accordance with the 
slowing hypothesis (Salthouse, 1996), research has shown that older adults 
need more time to process ideas in propositionally dense sentences in a text 
and at clause boundaries where information from the sentence is updated 
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(Payne & Stine-Morrow, 2014; Stine-Morrow & Hindman, 1994). The need to 
allocate more resources to the processing of more effort-demanding parts of a 
text could exhaust the available capacity to do so adequately (Kemper, Crow, 
& Kemtes, 2004). Indeed, older adults have shown marked declines in text 
processing ability, especially at the surface and textbase level (Radvansky, 
1999; Radvansky, Zwaan, Curiel, & Copeland, 2001; Stine-Morrow, Loveless, 
& Soederberg, 1996). 
Another area of cognitive decline in older age has to do with a decrease in 
working memory capacity with increasing age (Salthouse & Babcock, 1991). 
Limitations in working memory capacity increase chances that recently 
processed sentences are forgotten and that the construction of a text 
representation is hindered (De Beni, Borella, & Carretti, 2007; Norman, 
Kemper, & Kynette, 1992). This was demonstrated in older adults reading 
texts with higher syntactical complexity (Norman et al., 1992) and when they 
were processing cognitively demanding text components, such as clause and 
sentence boundaries (Payne & Stine-Morrow, 2014). 
Inhibitory processes are a third area of cognitive ability that declines with age 
(e.g., Radvansky, Zacks, & Hasher, 1996). Specifically, the inhibition-deficit 
account (Hasher & Zacks, 1988) has been used to explain cognitive deficits in 
various tasks in older adults. According to this account, older adults are less 
able to prevent irrelevant information from entering working memory or to 
suppress information in working memory that is no longer relevant. Indeed, a 
study by Radvansky, Zacks, and Hasher (2005) found that older adults are less 
able to suppress information from competing situation models during a long-
term memory retrieval task compared to young adults. 
Given the impact of these age-related declines on textbase construction 
(Radvansky et al., 2001), text processing (Stine-Morrow & Hindman, 1994), 
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and suppressing information, one would expect this to have a negative effect 
on situation model updating as well. As changes in events require more effort 
to incorporate these changes into an updated situation model according to the 
event-indexing model (Zwaan et al., 1995), situation model construction and 
updating should be more difficult for older adults than younger adults. A 
thorough review of the extant literature on this topic, however, reveals 
different results regarding age differences depending on the extent to which 
situation models are created and updated. 
When situation models are created at a sentence level, age-related slowing in 
processing the information may occur, yet working memory may not be overly 
taxed in older adult because a limited amount of information has to be 
processed. Consequently, similar situation models may be constructed by 
younger and older adults. This issue was examined in a sentence–picture 
verification task in which participants read a sentence about an object (i.e., an 
eagle in the air) that was followed by a visual depiction of the object that 
either matched the implied shape of the object (e.g., an eagle with wings 
outstretched) in the sentence or mismatched (e.g., an eagle with the wings 
folded) with it (Dijkstra, Yaxley, Madden, & Zwaan, 2004). Generally, if 
readers create a situation model of the sentence, then the implied shape of the 
object matters and should result in faster response times for matching pictures 
than for mismatching pictures (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001). The results 
indicated that older readers not only demonstrated a similar facilitation for the 
match effect as young adults, but even demonstrated a larger slowdown of 
responses when the picture mismatched, even when the variability in 
responses time was controlled for. Older adults had longer response latencies 
than younger adults overall, but similar performance on the comprehension 
questions as younger adults supporting the idea of a similar situation model 
construction. 
1414447-Mannaert_BNW.indd   91 17-01-20   16:42
Situation Model Updating in Young and Older Adults 
?
84 
?
Possibly, longer reading times for the sentences in older adults allowed them 
to build a more elaborate situation model that would be protected from 
overwriting by a mismatching picture. This coincides with a differential 
allocation of time in older adults in sentence comprehension studies where 
older adults spent more time at clause boundaries to comprehend the text 
(Kemper et al., 2004). Presumably, older adults have different strategies when 
creating situation models, compensating for declines in slowing and working 
memory capacity by allocating more resources to process the text where it is 
needed most (i.e., comparing the implied shape of the sentence with the 
picture presented after the sentence) to comprehend these texts effectively. 
Would this lack of age difference regarding situation model construction hold 
for the same task but in a setting that taxes working memory to a greater 
extent? This issue was examined in another study using the sentence-
verification task in younger and older adults but with participants listening to 
the sentences over headphones and naming the pictures that appeared after the 
sentence (Madden & Dijkstra, 2009). Here, the task could be considered more 
effortful because it required a more active response (i.e., naming the object) 
and the maintenance of the processed information from auditory information 
in working memory. The results again demonstrated a greater match effect in 
older adults despite the more taxing demands on working memory. Moreover, 
the match effect was larger in older adults with a higher working memory span 
than young adults with a higher working memory span. Again, older adults 
seemed to allocate more resources of their working memory capacity to 
maintain and update relevant information for the situation model. Why did 
higher task demands not have a negative effect on the performance of older 
adults? Possibly, the situation model that high span older adults created from 
their allocation of resources to a single sentence was even more difficult to 
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override with a mismatching picture than the model created by low span older 
adults or young adults. 
The results of these two studies suggest no age differences in situation model 
creation, not even when working memory capacity is taxed to a greater extent. 
In terms of the distinction between constructed and integrated situation 
models, these results imply that there is no age impairment for the 
construction of situation models. If anything, older adults are at an advantage 
for the construction of difficult-to-overwrite situation models, as they 
illustrated a larger slowdown in responses for mismatching than matching 
pictures. The question is whether this would also be true for integrated 
situation models as they not only require more working memory capacity to 
keep track of changes in the situation but also need to maintain links with the 
current situation model and long-term memory. We will discuss several 
studies below that looked into potential age differences regarding updating 
processes when one of the dimensions that are part of the event-indexing 
model (Zwaan et al., 1995), such as time, location, objects, or characters, 
changed and required updating of situation models. 
One of the early studies on situation model updating focused on answers to 
probes about narratives that varied in distance from the protagonist. Older 
adults answered probes about objects in a room (e.g. shelves in the library) 
that were distant from a protagonist in narratives more slowly than objects in a 
room that were closer to the protagonist. Moreover, this distance effect was 
larger for older than for younger adults (Morrow, Leirer, Altieri, & 
Fitzsimmons, 1994). In a follow-up experiment, Morrow, Stine-Morrow, 
Leirer, Andrassy, and Kahn (1997) had younger and older participants again 
read narratives about a protagonist who moved through space, which resulted 
in varying distances of objects in those spaces. Reading times rather than 
probe times were assessed and again showed slowing in both age groups when 
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the objects in a room were more distant from the protagonist, and again there 
was a larger slowdown in the older age group. Moreover, older adults with 
better reading comprehension of the narratives showed more slowing for 
sentences when updating required the integration of earlier information into 
the model. Both younger and older adults successfully managed to update the 
situation model, but this came at a cost for older adults. Only by slowing down 
in reading time were they able to update their situation model, yet their 
comprehension ability is the same as that of their younger counterparts. 
Research on updating processes of other dimensions of the event-indexing 
model, such as time and goal completion, also showed longer reading times in 
older adults relative to younger adults when there were shifts in these 
dimensions. Radvansky, Copeland, Berish, and Dijkstra (2003) examined 
potential age differences in temporal updating in situation models. Young 
adults and older adults read narratives with either short (a moment later) or 
long time-shifts (a day later). Presumably, a short time shift requires little 
updating of the situation model, whereas a long time shift requires substantial 
updating, which should be noticeable in the response times. For example, a 
wall that is being painted does not look very different a moment later, but it 
will look entirely different a day later when one assumes the painting 
continued for some time. Indeed, this substantial updating was reflected in 
longer reading times in younger and older adults for the narratives that 
contained a longer time shift. The size of the effect was larger in older adults, 
again suggesting more sensitivity to the situation model updating manipulation 
among older adults. 
Goal completion was examined among younger and older readers in a study 
by Radvansky and Curiel (1998). Younger and older participants read a 
narrative that contained a goal that the protagonist obtained, failed to obtain, 
or had a neutral outcome. Response times to probe questions about the goal 
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revealed that the availability of the goal decreased, as indicated by longer 
response times, equally in younger and older readers for the completed goal 
relative to the failed goal. Both age groups showed similar differences in 
response times and were therefore equally sensitive to the manipulation. In 
contrast to the other studies discussed above, the slowdown in response time 
in Radvansky and Curiel’s (1998) study was not greater for older than young 
adults. Apparently, it depends on the dimension of the event-indexing model 
that changed, location, time, or goal completion, whether or not updating 
occurs differently for younger versus older readers. 
Based on the studies that tested predictions from the event-indexing model in 
a younger and older population, we can conclude that they hold equally well 
for both age groups. In general, younger and older adults demonstrate similar 
updating and integration ability of the situation model in narratives (Morrow 
et al., 1994; Morrow, Stine-Morrow, Leirer, Andrassy, & Kahn, 1997; 
Radvansky, Copeland, Berish, & Dijkstra, 2003; Radvansky & Curiel, 1998; 
Radvansky et al., 2001) despite stronger demands on available memory 
capacity to do so in older adults. Stronger age effects as reflected in longer 
reading or response times may be due to the establishment of more elaborate 
situation models based on more extensive reading experiences. Rather than 
having more difficulty establishing links between the current and integrated 
situation model and with long-term memory in older adults, their extensive 
reading experiences may actually help them to accomplish this. The ability to 
establish and maintain integrated situation models may also be due to a 
stronger emphasis on global and top-down text processing strategies relative 
to young adults who may focus more on surface-based and bottom-up 
processing. These successful strategies in older adults to deal with more 
effortful task demands at a global level may be a way to compensate for age-
related declines at the lower surface or textbase level (Stine-Morrow, Morrow, 
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& Leno, 2002). For some changes in dimensions (location, time), this may be 
easier than for other changes (goal), hence the lack of stronger age effects 
there. 
As stated earlier, updating processes along one dimension of the situation 
model is consistent with incremental updating. The event-indexing model 
supports the idea of continuous, incremental updating as demonstrated in 
longer reading and response times for manipulated dimensions in the 
narrative. As a whole, incremental updating appears intact in older adults, as 
seen by adequate situation model construction and updating ability when 
changes in location, time, and goals occur as long as sufficient processing time 
is allocated to allow this form of updating to occur. Stronger match effects in 
the picture-verification tasks discussed earlier (Dijkstra et al., 2004; Madden 
& Dijkstra, 2009) can also be considered as a form of incremental updating 
when a picture is compared with the mental representation of the implied 
shape of an object in the preceding sentence. 
The question is how far this goes. Will older adults still be able to update their 
situation model when more extensive updating of the situation model is 
required? A study examining the fan effect (Radvansky, Zacks, & Hasher, 
1996) demonstrated that, even though both older and younger adults could 
easily integrate information into a single situation model when reading 
sentences describing different objects in the same location (e.g., a potted palm 
and a bulletin board at an airport), age differences occurred when the same 
object was described to be in different locations (e.g., a potted palm in an 
airport, hotel, and restaurant). Because multiple situation models had to be 
constructed to represent objects in different locations, global updating was 
necessary and interference occurred during retrieval. Older adults suffered 
more from this interference as seen by the larger fan effect. It is therefore 
plausible that, when event boundaries are perceived and global updating has to 
1414447-Mannaert_BNW.indd   96 17-01-20   16:42
Situation Model Updating in Young and Older Adults 
?
89 
?
occur (as predicted by the event segmentation theory), older adults may have 
more difficulty doing so. 
This assumption is supported by the results of a study that required the 
construction of multiple situation models and global updating with regard to 
changes in characters in a narrative. Noh and Stine-Morrow (2009) 
demonstrated that older participants had more difficulty than younger adults in 
accessing previously mentioned protagonists in a narrative after a new one 
was introduced. This happened even though older adults over-allocated 
processing time to instantiate the first character in a narrative. As was the case 
in the previous study (Radvansky et al., 1996), multiple situation models had 
to be constructed to keep track of all protagonists in the narrative. This 
required global updating to create a new situation model that still contains all 
relevant information of the older model. Possibly, due to constraints to their 
working memory capacity, older readers had difficulty to allocate sufficient 
resources to characters introduced later in a narrative in an effort to maintain 
representations of characters that were introduced earlier. Their difficulty in 
doing so reflects a deficit in global updating among older adults. 
This does not necessarily mean that older adults always have difficulty with 
global updating processes. Results of a study by Radvansky, Pettijohn, and 
Kim (2015) suggest that under certain circumstances, older adults are equally 
capable of updating their situation models globally (i.e., at event boundaries). 
In their study, both young and older adults had to move an object in a virtual 
environment, either within the same room or through a doorway. The results 
found a location updating effect as seen by participants’ increased forgetting 
when an event boundary was crossed, suggesting global updating. 
Importantly, the effect sizes were similar for both age groups, suggesting that 
older adults do not have more difficulty updating their situation model at event 
boundaries compared to young adults. 
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The ability in older adults to update situation models globally in a similar 
manner as younger adults is further supported by a study on event 
segmentation by Magliano, Kopp, McNerney, Radvansky, and Zacks (2012), 
who had young and older participants segment either text-based or visually 
based narratives into separate events. They found that both older and young 
adults were similarly sensitive to situational changes resulting in good 
between-group segmentation agreement. However, older adults tended to 
create smaller segments in a narrative than younger adults. Possibly, older 
adults perceived event boundaries with fewer situational changes than younger 
adults. This is less taxing on their resources and helps older adults to update 
their situation model adequately. Although more research is needed to test 
this, it could suggest that older adults indeed tend update their situation 
models globally more often than young adults, possibly as a strategy to avoid 
placing heavy demands on their working memory capacity. Differential age 
differences with regard to global updating in different studies could be due to 
the extent to which how much updating is required to construct integrated 
situation models and how older adults may use strategies to do so. To assess 
whether this happens, changes within and beyond event boundaries have to be 
examined systematically in younger and older adults. 
Bailey and Zacks (2015) did just that by controlling for changes in characters 
and locations in narratives. They found that, although older adults generally 
read more slowly than young adults, they had faster reading times for a probe 
that followed no change in the text than for a probe that followed a change in 
the text, which is indicative of global updating. Young adults, however, did 
not show such differences in changes for the probes. This suggests that, when 
changes occur in a narrative, for example, a character moving from the kitchen 
to the basement, older readers are not only slower when responding to probes 
about the basement but also to probes about the character (e.g., a change in 
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hairdo), when compared to control probes. In other words, older adults do not 
only update the element that changes in the situation (location), which 
suggests incremental updating, but also to elements that did not change but are 
part of the new situation, which suggests global updating. No clear support for 
either incremental or global updating processes was found for young adults. It 
seems that older adults strategize their resources to allocate them where they 
are most needed and are thus able to successfully update their situation model. 
Conclusion 
Research on cognitive aging over the past several decades has often focused 
on declines in cognitive functioning (Zacks et al., 2000; Norman et al., 1992). 
Given that the updating mechanism of situation models appears to rely on the 
interaction between working memory and long-term memory, it is possible 
that this interaction is mediated by aging processes. Therefore, it would be 
reasonable to assume that the construction of situation models should be more 
difficult in older adults who have reduced working memory capacity relative 
to young adults, as the requisite linking between the current and integrated 
situation model would require more effort than if information was simply 
maintained in the current situation model. 
Interestingly, several studies have shown that, even when controlling for the 
longer reading times, older adults still create mental representations during 
text comprehension both for shorter and longer texts (Dijkstra et al., 2004; 
Madden & Dijkstra, 2009; Morrow et al., 1994, 1997; Radvansky et al., 2001, 
2003; Radvansky & Dijkstra, 2007). Furthermore, these findings support the 
notion that the constructed situation model can be more elaborate in older 
adults than in young adults, thus providing protection against contradictory (or 
mismatching) information. Perhaps most importantly, however, are the 
findings that younger and older adults appear to demonstrate similar capacities 
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for updating and integrating information in the situation model, albeit that 
older adults do this more slowly. 
We can draw the following conclusions from our discussion of situation model 
updating in younger and older adults. First, updating occurs when there is a 
change in the situation of the events described in a text. In the event-indexing 
model, this change can be along one dimension (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998), 
such as location, time, or goals, or in the event segmentation theory along 
several dimensions (Kurby & Zacks, 2012). In both cases, updating occurs but 
the difference is whether only the new dimension is being updated 
(continuously in incremental updating) or all information is being updated 
(global updating). Older adults are able to update their situation model 
globally (Bailey & Zacks, 2015; Radvansky et al., 2015), but not always. 
When multiple situation models have to be created, for example, when objects 
are described in different locations, or when multiple characters are introduced 
in a narrative, updating processes may be too taxing on available working 
memory capacity in older adults to do so (Noh & Stine-Morrow, 2009; 
Radvansky et al., 1996). Future research could look into this matter more 
closely by examining the point at which updating in older adults no longer can 
be compensated for by allocating resources to the task. For example, what 
happens when older adults are not able or allowed to allocate more attentional 
resources to certain parts of the texts. Are they still able to construct and 
update situation models adequately then? 
Secondly, older adults appear to be able to construct and integrate situation 
models along one or several dimensions as well as young adults but generally 
need more time for this, even if they have a higher working memory span. 
Situation model updating ability in older adults may be a way to compensate 
for needing to allocate more effort there (i.e., due to text complexity or task 
demand) where it is needed most. Only when they are able to allocate more 
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resources to that task can they maintain successful updating performance. As 
described above, there may be a limit to the extent to which they are able to do 
that. Future studies could focus more specifically on how older adults utilize 
their extensive reading experiences to draw resources from long-term memory 
to construct and update a situation model. Older adults could be better at 
removing less relevant information from their situation models which would 
contradict an inhibitory deficit account (Bailey & Zacks, 2015). Alternatively, 
older adults could utilize different strategies relating to other goals when 
reading a narrative, or different self-regulatory activities, relative to young 
adults (Stine-Morrow, Miller, & Hertzog, 2006) 
Apart from more research on incremental and global updating processes in 
younger and older readers, future research could incorporate insights from 
related domains. For example, language comprehension research from an 
embodied cognition perspective could be relevant to examine situation model 
updating from a different angle. Embodied cognition research has shown 
examples of how sensorimotor activation facilitates reading and updating 
processes (Dijkstra & Post, 2015). In a study on motor resonance, sensibility 
judgments about sentences by turning a knob clockwise or counterclockwise 
were faster when the manual response to the sentence was in the same rotation 
direction as the manual action described by the sentence (Zwaan & Taylor, 
2006). Research on situation model updating could build on these findings by 
exploring different ways to examine updating processes in situation models in 
different age groups. Sensorimotor manipulations could be employed to see if 
older adults benefit differentially from such manipulations when they 
construct and update their situation model. For example, rotate a knob to move 
forward in a text that in which rotation is an important element in situation 
model construction could facilitate updating of a situation model, pressing a 
space bar faster when reading about a character speeding up in a narrative, and 
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could facilitate updating processes as well. The interesting question here 
would be to assess whether sensorimotor facilitation would occur both for 
incremental and global updating processes. 
To conclude, situation model updating is a process supporting language 
comprehension and appears to remain intact during aging, despite the declines 
in other cognitive processes. After a period in which research more heavily 
focused on the negative aspects of aging in relation to cognitive functions, 
evidence converges toward preserved abilities in aging and reading 
comprehension and how older adults successfully allocate their resources to 
maintain these skills.   
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The main research question of interest in this dissertation can be formulated as 
follows: how is the perceptual content of mental simulations affected by 
language comprehension? This question can be divided into several 
subquestions, which were discussed in the previous chapters. 
What is the role of color in mental simulations? 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 examined the role of color in mental simulations. In 
Chapter 2, participants read sentences that implied that an object had a 
particular color (e.g., The driving instructor told Bob to stop/go at the traffic 
lights), before responding to a picture of an object where the color either 
matched or mismatched the one implied by the previous sentence. Each 
experiment provided participants with the same sentences, but the pictures 
were shown in decreasing levels of saturation, in order to examine the 
activation of color in mental simulations. Given that previous studies had 
shown contradictory results regarding whether the match effect could be 
replicated for color as well, it was important to resolve this issue once and for 
all. The findings of our study provided evidence that color is activated in 
mental simulations, as participants responded significantly faster to the 
matching pictures compared to the mismatching pictures, when they were 
shown in full saturation. When the saturation of the pictures was reduced to 
the lowest level at which the hue could still be recognized, the match effect 
disappeared. Similarly, when the pictures were shown in grayscale, the match 
effect disappeared. These findings suggests that the match effect is actually 
created by the interference that occurs when there is a vivid difference 
between the pictured object and the mental simulation in the mismatch 
condition. Once this difference is removed (i.e., by reducing the saturation in 
pictures or by showing them in grayscale), there is no more interference, 
leading to the elimination of the match effect.  
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Chapter 6 examined the continued activation of color in a broader discourse 
context. In the first experiment, participants either read sentences that 
contained a reference to a color (e.g., The boy rode on the red bicycle to the 
station), or made no reference to a color (e.g., The boy rode on the bicycle to 
the station), before responding to pictures that were shown in a color matching 
the one described by the previous sentence, or shown in grayscale. Participants 
responded significantly faster to the pictures shown in color, when the 
sentence contained a reference to that color. When no reference was made to a 
color, there was no significant difference between the responses to the colored 
or grayscale pictures. The findings from this experiment support those from 
Chapter 2, as both studies provide evidence for the activation of color in 
mental simulations when this is relevant to understanding the events described 
in the text.  
In the second experiment, participants read two-sentence items, where either 
the first sentence contained a reference to a color, or the final sentence 
contained a reference to a color. Here, participants responded significantly 
faster to the colored picture compared to the grayscale picture, regardless of 
whether the color was mentioned in the first or final sentence. This finding 
suggests that color remains activated in mental simulations when the target 
object is continuously being referred to. In the third experiment, the attention 
was shifted away from the target object using three filler sentences (out of five 
sentences in total), where either the first or final sentence made a reference to 
a color. Here, participants responded significantly faster to the picture shown 
in grayscale, compared to the colored picture, when the first sentence made a 
reference to a color. This suggests that color becomes deactivated in mental 
simulations when the focus is shifted away from the target object, thus making 
the activation of color unnecessary for understanding the events of the text.    
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The findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 are in line with the studies that 
show that color is one of the object properties that is actively simulated during 
language comprehension (e.g. Zwaan & Pecher, 2012). Chapter 2 further 
highlights the importance of performing replication studies, as there was 
disagreement in the literature regarding the role of color in mental simulations. 
Furthermore, the findings from Chapter 6 fall in line with those from Swallow 
et al. (2009), who found that perceptual information can remain activated in 
event models when objects are salient and present at event boundaries. In 
Experiment 2 of our study, color remained activated as the target object was 
present in both sentences. When the focus was shifted away from the target 
object, color was no longer activated in mental simulations. This finding 
supports both weakly and strongly embodied theories of cognitions, as color is 
activated in mental simulations when it is required for the comprehension of 
the events in a narrative, but deactivates when it is no longer relevant to the 
narrative.  
How are mental simulations updated? 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 targeted the question of how mental simulations are 
updated, whereby Chapter 3 focused specifically on the activation of shape 
information in mental simulations in a changing discourse context, and 
Chapter 4 on the updating of situation models in older and young adults.  
In Chapter 3, participants read sentences that either implied a change in shape 
over the course of two or four sentences, or implied no change in shape, 
before responding to a picture that either matched the initial shape (which was 
implied by the first sentence) or matched the final shape (which was implied 
by the final sentence). Although many studies that have been published have 
examined the updating of situation models, this has never been examined 
before at the level of the mental simulation. We were interested in examining 
how the activation of perceptual information changes across several sentences. 
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Given that comprehenders can reactivate perceptual information in a mental 
simulation if this is required, it is possible that this reactivation would be 
necessary in order to understand that changes are occurring to an object in a 
narrative. Another possibility is that, during the updating process, the contents 
of the mental simulations are replaced by the new incoming information. Our 
study found support for the second possibility, as participants responded 
significantly faster when the shape matched the one implied by the final 
sentence, suggesting that the initial shape becomes deactivated in a mental 
simulation as the more recent shape is activated. These findings support those 
of Sato, Schafer, and Bergen (2013), who reported that mental simulations are 
updated when participants receive information contradictory to the initially 
simulated shape.  
As such, the findings from Chapter 3 suggest that, in order to comprehend 
changes occurring in a narrative, the mental simulation only activates the 
perceptual information that is required for understanding the current (i.e., most 
recent) event. Similar to the conclusions made from Chapter 6, this provides 
support for the embodied theories of cognition, as only the relevant perceptual 
information is activated in the mental simulation to support language 
comprehension. 
Chapter 4 examined how situation models update in young and older adult 
populations by reviewing the current literature on this topic. Due to aging, 
many cognitive processes become impaired, which can lead to various 
problems in the everyday functioning of older individuals. Despite the large 
number of studies that report declines in cognitive functioning, many studies 
on situation model updating in older adults have focused on the preservation 
of cognitive skills. The review reports several studies that show that older 
adults are equally capable of updating their situation models compared to 
young adults, even if they take longer to do so. Interestingly, older adults also 
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may create a more elaborate situation model compared to young adults, as 
their situation model appears to be resistant to contradictory information. As 
such, younger and older adults appear to have similar capacities for updating 
their situation models to represent the current events unfolding in a narrative.         
Is perceptual information combined in mental simulations? 
Chapter 5 examined whether perceptual information can be combined in 
mental simulations. Here, participants read sentences describing an animal 
performing an action with a tool, before responding to pictures of cartoon 
animals holding a tool. They were either instructed to judge whether the 
pictured animal was mentioned in the previous sentence, or whether the 
pictured tool was mentioned in the previous sentence. The shown picture 
could either be a complete match (both animal and tool matched the previous 
sentence), a partial match or mismatch (either the animal or the tool would 
match), or a complete mismatch (neither animal nor tool would match the 
previous sentence). If comprehenders create a complete mental simulation of 
an event to support language comprehension, then both the animal and the tool 
should be activated in a mental simulation, regardless of task instructions. 
However, if task instructions can modulate the contents of mental simulations, 
then this would have serious consequences for our current understanding of 
the role that mental simulations play in language comprehension. The results 
of our study illustrated that participants responded significantly faster to the 
complete match condition compared to the partial match condition, regardless 
of task instruction, suggesting that comprehenders do create a complete mental 
simulation to understand the events described in a sentence.  
The findings from Chapter 5 are consistent with the findings of Chapter 6, as 
both studies illustrate that, when perceptual information is necessary for 
language comprehension, it is activated in a mental simulation. When this 
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information is not necessary (as in the third experiment of Chapter 6), then it 
does not activate.  
General conclusions 
Several conclusions regarding the role of mental simulations in language 
comprehension can be drawn from the findings of this dissertation. In Chapter 
1, several arguments were put forward regarding the requirement of 
sensorimotor information for language comprehension. The findings of the 
current dissertation are in line with the growing body of evidence that 
sensorimotor information is partially required for language comprehension. 
The word ‘partially’ is important here. We did not find support for a complete 
dependence on sensorimotor systems, as this would mean that perceptual 
information would have to be continuously activated in mental simulations. 
Instead, our findings illustrate that perceptual information is activated in 
mental simulations only when this is relevant for understanding the events 
described in the text. For instance, when color is referred to in a sentence, this 
leads to the activation of color in mental simulations. When attention is shifted 
away from the target object for a while before reintroducing that object – but 
without a reference to color – this leads to the deactivation of color in mental 
simulations. This means that, when an entity is introduced in a text, the 
perceptual information associated with that entity is stored, but is not 
reactivated each time that entity is reintroduced in the text. 
Secondly, we found that, when changes to an object’s shape are implied in a 
text, the initially activated shape becomes deactivated as the more recent 
shape activates in a mental simulation. This suggests that, when changes are 
made to entities described in a narrative, that the initially simulated entity is 
replaced in the mental simulation by the new version. Putting this in the 
context of reading a novel, this would mean that if, for example, one reads 
about a character who cuts her hair, the mental simulation would update (or 
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replace) the initial simulation of that character by deactivating that initial 
simulation first.  
Thirdly, we found that, when multiple objects are mentioned in a sentence, 
both objects are activated in a mental simulation, irrespective of task 
instructions. This suggests that comprehenders routinely activate mental 
simulations to support language comprehension. If only one of the objects 
would have been simulated, then this would mean that mental simulations are 
not required for language comprehension. However, given that both objects 
were routinely activated during language comprehension, this points to a clear 
role of mental simulations in language comprehension. 
Finally, we found that, despite the decline in cognitive functions as a result of 
aging, this does not impair the ability of comprehenders to update their 
situation models. If anything, due to their extensive reading experience, it 
appears as though older adults create a more elaborate situation model that is 
more resilient to contradictory information.  
Together, these findings provide support for the embodied theories of 
cognition. When perceptual information is required to understand the events 
described in a text, this information is activated in a mental simulation. As 
soon as the events of a narrative change, this perceptual information is 
deactivated and replaced by more recent information in order to accurately 
reflect the current situation model. As such, mental simulations can be 
considered to be dynamic in the sense that they continuously update and 
change their perceptual contents to reflect the narrative.  
Suggestions for future research 
The main problem with theories of grounded (or embodied) cognition is that 
they lack specificity. As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is currently impossible to 
determine whether cognition occurs via interactions with the sensorimotor 
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systems or via a partial dependence on sensorimotor systems. The research 
described in this dissertation suggests that sensorimotor information is 
required for language comprehension. However, because several aspects of 
these theories are vague (and at times contradictory) in how they describe the 
role of sensorimotor information in cognitive processes, it is essentially 
possible for both weak embodiment and secondary embodiment to serve as 
potential explanations for these findings. This means that in the future, 
theories need to be specified further so that it is possible to test empirically 
whether semantic content is grounded by interaction or by using the 
sensorimotor systems directly for the various cognitive functions.   
Another problem with research on mental simulations is that they often use 
single sentences to study the activation of perceptual information during 
language comprehension. Although some of the research in the current 
dissertation has attempted to remedy this problem, it is important for future 
research to continue improving the quality of texts used in experiments, so that 
the findings of those studies can be generalized to how language 
comprehension functions in real life.  
The current dissertation has examined the role of mental simulations in 
language comprehension by using empirical research to test specific 
hypotheses that were pre-registered before data collection started. One of the 
pillars of good research is the pre-registration of the hypotheses, method and 
analysis plan of a study before starting data collection. In a time where the 
reliability of psychological findings is questioned due to the occurrence of 
questionable research practices, it is crucial that researchers become 
accustomed to carrying out pre-registrations. By continuing the movement 
toward good research practices, the quality of research in psychology can be 
guaranteed, rather than speculated upon.    
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The underlying mechanisms of language comprehension have been a topic of 
debate for centuries. One of the most popular theories on language 
comprehension are theories of grounded cognition. These theories suggest that 
we use the same sensorimotor regions in the brain during activity as during 
cognitive processes, through the use of mental simulations. Many behavioral 
and neuroimaging studies have been conducted over the past two centuries to 
show that the contents of these simulations are modal in nature and that they 
are involved in language comprehension. The aim of the current dissertation is 
to further examine the mechanisms of mental simulations in language 
comprehension. This was accomplished by exploring the role of color in 
mental simulations (Chapter 2), the process of updating in mental simulations 
(Chapter 3), its use in language comprehension in younger versus older adults 
(Chapter 4), the ability for multiple objects to be combined in mental 
simulations (Chapter 5), and finally, the examination of the continuous 
activation of mental simulations (Chapter 6).  
Many behavioral studies using the sentence-picture verification paradigm have 
found that various object properties (e.g. shape, orientation, visibility, etc.) are 
simulated during language comprehension. Interestingly, research on the 
presence of color in mental simulations has led to mixed findings (Connell, 
2007; Zwaan & Pecher, 2012). One of the aims of Chapter 2 was to resolve 
this issue. This was accomplished by conceptually replicating the original 
study on color, using the same paradigm but a different stimulus set. The 
second goal of this study was to assess how much perceptual information is 
included in a mental simulation. If reduction of one aspect of color does not 
alter the match effect, it would suggest that not all perceptual information is 
relevant for a mental simulation. Our results did not support this: We found a 
match advantage when objects were shown at normal levels of saturation, but 
this match advantage disappeared when saturation was reduced. Taken 
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together, these results clearly show a strong match effect for color, and the 
perceptual richness of mental simulations during language comprehension. 
Over the past several decades many studies have examined how situation 
models are updated, yet this had never been examined at the level of the 
mental simulation. Chapter 3 examined how mental simulations are updated 
when there is an implied change of shape, over the course of several 
sentences. Given that comprehenders can reactivate perceptual information in 
a mental simulation if this is required, it is possible that this reactivation 
would be necessary in order to understand that changes are occurring to an 
object in a narrative. Another possibility is that, during the updating process, 
the contents of the mental simulations are replaced by the new incoming 
information. Our study found support for the second possibility, as 
participants responded significantly faster when the shape matched the one 
implied by the final sentence, suggesting that the initial shape becomes 
deactivated in a mental simulation as the more recent shape is activated. 
Chapter 4 presents a review of the prominent theories on situation model 
updating, the evidence for preservation of this function in an aging population, 
and how this compares to young adults. The review reports several studies that 
show that older adults are equally capable of updating their situation models 
compared to young adults, even if they take longer to do so. Interestingly, 
older adults also may create a more elaborate situation model compared to 
young adults, as their situation model appears to be resistant to contradictory 
information. As such, younger and older adults appear to have similar 
capacities for updating their situation models to represent the current events 
unfolding in a narrative. 
Studies on the presence of mental simulations during language comprehension 
have typically focused only on single object properties. Chapter 5 
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investigates whether two objects are combined in mental simulations, and 
whether this is influenced by task instructions. In two experiments, 
participants read sentences describing animals using a tool in some way. After 
each sentence, they saw an image of a cartoon animal holding a tool, and they 
indicated whether the animal or the tool was mentioned in the previous 
sentence or not. If comprehenders create a complete mental simulation of an 
event to support language comprehension, then both the animal and the tool 
should be activated in a mental simulation, regardless of task instructions The 
results suggest that mental simulations indeed combine multiple objects during 
language comprehension, and that this is not influenced by task instructions, 
suggesting that language comprehension leads to the creation of a complete 
mental simulation. 
Chapter 6 examined the continued activation of color in a broader discourse 
context. Participants read sentences that either contained a reference to a color, 
or no reference to a color, before responding to pictures that were shown in a 
color matching the one described by the previous sentence, or shown in 
grayscale. The current study examines the continued activation of color in 
mental simulations across one, two, and five sentences. The results illustrated 
that color was activated in mental simulations when the final sentence 
contained a reference to color. When the target object (e.g. bicycle) was 
mentioned in all sentences, color remained activated in the mental simulation, 
even when only the first sentence made a reference to a color. When the focus 
of the story was shifted elsewhere and the target object was not present across 
all sentences, color was no longer activated in the mental simulation. These 
findings suggest that color remains active in mental simulations so long as the 
target object is present in every sentence. As soon as the focus of the story 
shifts to another event, this perceptual information is deactivated in the mental 
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simulation. As such, there is no continued activation of color across a broader 
discourse context. 
Taken together, the chapters from this dissertation provide further support for 
the theories of embodied (or grounded) cognition. When perceptual 
information is required to understand the events described in a text, this 
information is activated in a mental simulation.
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Er wordt al eeuwenlang gediscussieerd over de onderliggende mechanismen 
van taalbegrip. Theorieën over grounded cognition zijn op het moment een 
van de meest populaire theorieën over taalbegrip. Deze theorieën suggereren 
dat we dezelfde sensomotorische gebieden in de hersenen gebruiken tijdens 
activiteiten als tijdens cognitieve processen, door het gebruik van mentale 
simulaties. Er zijn de afgelopen twee eeuwen veel gedrags- en 
neurobiologische onderzoeken uitgevoerd om aan te tonen dat de inhoud van 
deze simulaties modaal van aard is en dat deze simulaties betrokken zijn bij 
taalbegrip. Het doel van dit proefschrift is om de mechanismen van mentale 
simulaties in taalbegrip verder te onderzoeken. Daartoe zijn de volgende 
onderwerpen onderzocht: de rol van kleur in mentale simulaties (hoofdstuk 
2), het updateproces in mentale simulaties (hoofdstuk 3), het gebruik van 
mentale simulaties in taalbegrip bij jongere versus oudere volwassenen 
(hoofdstuk 4), het vermogen om meerdere objecten te combineren in mentale 
simulaties (hoofdstuk 5) en de voortdurende activering van mentale 
simulaties (hoofdstuk 6). 
Veel gedragsstudies hebben gebruik gemaakt van het sentence-picture 
verification paradigma om aan te tonen dat verschillende objecteigenschappen 
(bijv. vorm, oriëntatie, zichtbaarheid, etc.) worden gesimuleerd tijdens 
taalbegrip. Interessant genoeg is dat onderzoek naar de aanwezigheid van 
kleur in mentale simulaties heeft geleid tot gemengde bevindingen (Connell, 
2007; Zwaan & Pecher, 2012). Eén van de doelstellingen van hoofdstuk 2 
was om duidelijkheid in deze situatie te brengen. Dit werd bereikt door de 
oorspronkelijke studie over kleur conceptueel te repliceren, met behulp van 
hetzelfde paradigma, maar met een andere stimulusset. Het tweede doel van 
deze studie was om te beoordelen hoeveel perceptuele informatie is 
opgenomen in een mentale simulatie. Als vermindering van één aspect van 
kleur het match-effect niet verandert, zou dit suggereren dat niet alle 
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perceptuele informatie relevant is voor een mentale simulatie. Het match effect 
ontstaat wanneer proefpersonen sneller reageren op een plaatje dat 
overeenkomt met de zin (bijv. reageren op een plaatje van een groen stoplicht 
wanneer de een groen stoplicht impiceert) dan wanneer dit plaatje niet 
overeenkomt (bijv. reageren op een plaatje van een rood stoplicht wanneer de 
zin een groen stoplicht impliceert). Onze resultaten ondersteunden dit niet: we 
vonden een match effect wanneer objecten werden getoond op normale 
verzadigingsniveau’s, maar dit effect verdween toen de verzadiging werd 
verminderd. Al met al laten deze resultaten duidelijk een sterk match effect 
zien voor kleur en ondersteunen het idee van de perceptuele rijkdom van 
mentale simulaties tijdens taalbegrip. 
In de afgelopen decennia hebben veel studies onderzocht hoe situatiemodellen 
worden bijgewerkt, maar dit was nog nooit gedaan op het niveau van de 
mentale simulatie. Hoofdstuk 3 onderzocht hoe mentale simulaties worden 
bijgewerkt wanneer er een impliciete verandering van vorm is, in een serie 
zinnen. Aangezien het mogelijk is om perceptuele informatie in een mentale 
simulatie te heractiveren als dit nodig is, is het plausibel dat deze heractivering 
nodig is om te begrijpen dat er veranderingen optreden bij een voorwerp in 
een verhaal. Een andere mogelijkheid is dat tijdens het updateproces de 
inhoud van de mentale simulaties wordt vervangen door de nieuwe informatie 
die binnenkomt. Onze studie vond ondersteuning voor de tweede 
mogelijkheid, omdat deelnemers sneller reageerden toen de vorm 
overeenkwam met de vorm die werd gesuggereerd in de laatste zin. Dit 
suggereert dat de oorspronkelijke vorm in een mentale simulatie wordt 
gedeactiveerd naarmate de meer recente vorm van het object wordt 
geactiveerd. 
Hoofdstuk 4 presenteert een overzicht van de prominente theorieën over het 
bijwerken van het situatiemodel en het bewijs voor het behoud van deze 
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functie bij een vergrijzende bevolking en hoe dit zich verhoudt tot 
jongvolwassenen. Het literatuuronderzoek rapporteert over verschillende 
studies die aantonen dat oudere volwassenen even goed in staat zijn om hun 
situatie modellen bij te werken in vergelijking met jongvolwassenen,  ondanks 
het feit dat ze er langer over doen. Interessant is dat oudere volwassenen ook 
een uitgebreider situatiemodel kunnen maken in vergelijking met 
jongvolwassenen, omdat hun situatiemodel resistent lijkt te zijn tegen 
tegenstrijdige informatie. Jongere en oudere volwassenen lijken dus 
vergelijkbare capaciteiten te hebben om hun situatiemodellen bij te werken om 
de huidige gebeurtenissen in een verhaal weer te geven. 
Onderzoek naar de aanwezigheid van mentale simulaties tijdens het begrijpen 
van taal richtte zich meestal alleen op eigenschappen van afzonderlijke 
objecten. Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt of twee objecten kunnen worden 
gecombineerd in mentale simulaties en of dit wordt beïnvloed door 
taakinstructies. In twee experimenten lezen deelnemers zinnen waarin dieren 
worden beschreven die gereedschap gebruiken voor een doel. Na elke zin 
zagen de deelnemers een afbeelding van een cartoondier met gereedschap en 
ze gaven aan of het dier (of het gereedschap) in de vorige zin werd genoemd 
of niet. Als een volledige mentale simulatie van een gebeurtenis wordt 
gemaakt om taalbegrip te ondersteunen, dan moeten zowel het dier als het 
gereedschap worden geactiveerd in een mentale simulatie, ongeacht wat de 
taakinstructie is. Inderdaad suggereren de resultaten dat mentale simulaties 
meerdere objecten combineren tijdens taalbegrip, en dat dit niet wordt 
beïnvloed door taakinstructies. Dit impliceert dat taalbegrip leidt tot het 
creëren van een volledige mentale simulatie. 
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt de voortdurende activering van kleur in een bredere 
zinscontext. Deelnemers van de studie lazen zinnen die ofwel een verwijzing 
naar een kleur bevatten, ofwel geen verwijzing bevatten. Daarna reageerden ze 
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op foto’s die of werden getoond in een kleur die overeen kwam met de vorige 
zin, of werden getoond in grijswaarden. De huidige studie onderzocht de 
voortdurende activering van kleur in mentale simulaties in één, twee en vijf 
zinnen. De resultaten toonden aan dat kleur werd geactiveerd in mentale 
simulaties wanneer de laatste zin een verwijzing naar kleur bevatte. Wanneer 
het doelobject (bijv. fiets) in alle zinnen werd genoemd, bleef kleur 
geactiveerd in de mentale simulatie, zelfs wanneer alleen de eerste zin naar de 
kleur van het voorwerp verwees. Als de focus van het verhaal naar een ander 
gebeurtenis verschoof en het doelobject niet meer in alle zinnen aanwezig 
was, dan werd kleur niet meer geactiveerd in de mentale simulatie. Deze 
bevindingen suggereren dat kleur actief blijft in mentale simulaties zolang het 
doelobject in elke zin aanwezig is. Zodra de focus van het verhaal verschuift 
naar een andere gebeurtenis, wordt deze perceptuele informatie gedeactiveerd 
in de mentale simulatie. Er kan dus niet gesproken worden van een 
voortdurende activering van kleur in mentale simulaties in een bredere 
zinscontext.  
Samengevat bieden de hoofdstukken uit dit proefschrift verdere ondersteuning 
voor de theorieën van embodied (of grounded) cognition. Wanneer 
perceptuele informatie vereist is om de in een tekst beschreven gebeurtenissen 
te begrijpen, wordt deze informatie geactiveerd in een mentale simulatie. 
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STELLINGEN 
behorende bij het proefschrift 
Language Comprehension: 
Examining the Dynamic Changes in Activation of Mental Simulations 
Lara N. Hoeben Mannaert 
1. One of the solutions to the replication crisis in psychology is for researchers to 
preregister. (this dissertation) 
 
2. Mental simulations change the activation levels of the object traces during the 
process of updating. (this dissertation) 
 
3. Younger and older adults appear to demonstrate similar capacities for updating and 
integrating information in the situation model, albeit that older adults do this more 
slowly. (this dissertation) 
 
4. Comprehenders combine multiple objects in their mental simulations during 
language comprehension. (this dissertation) 
 
5. A complete situation model, containing all related information, is not created during 
discourse processing. Only information which is required for language 
comprehension needs to be activated in the situation model. (this dissertation) 
 
6. Bilinguals have two personalities. 
 
7. The ‘Lara phenomenon’ shows that leading roles in video games are more and more 
frequently portrayed by female characters. 
 
8. Companion animals improve mood and social interactions and reduce loneliness 
and problem behaviors in Alzheimer’s patients. 
 
9. Imagining a positive encounter with an outgroup member reduces prejudice. 
 
10. Being sleep-deprived works great as a human repellant. 
 
11. “Those who dare to fail miserably can achieve greatly.” (J. F. Kennedy) 
  
1414447-Mannaert_BNW.indd   213 17-01-20   16:42

